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VII Thailand 
Rapid Growth Driven by Export Markets 
Thailand has developed the premier agricultural export economy in the 
tropics at least in terms of its exporta of carbohydrate sources This 
export orientation dates to the 1850's when the signing of the Bowing 
treaty removed a ban by the Thai king on exports of rice The market 
stimulus to a subsistence economy with surplus land resources was immediate 
and rice exporta became the driving force in the Thai ｡ｧｲｾ｣ｵｬｴｵｲ｡ｬ＠ economy 
upto the Second World War The beginning of the post-war period marked the 
diversification of the Thai agricultural economy into upland crops again 
almost entirely directed to export markets Development of the upland 
sector has been the principal growth element in the Thai agricultural 
economy in the post-war period and has been based on expansion in maize 
kenaf cassava and sugar cane 
The upland sector in the post-war period has gene through a series of 
commodity booms These were based on area expansion within a land and 
labor surplus agricultural economy i e the limited size of domestic 
markets or the lack of export infrastructure was the most binding 
constraint on agricultural production The success of these booms 
resulted in a relative shortage of labor in the 1970's inducing the 
development of a market for tractor-hire services The motor of this 
growth process thus was the opening of market channels for export and 
relative price incentives in these markets However this growth process 
also reflected the vagaries of world market demand as is epitomized by the 
rise and collapse of the kenaf industry 
Cassava is the most recent of Thailand's commodity booms which is not 
to say that cassava is a recently introduced crop The exact date of 
introduction to Thailand is not known but cassava was apparently being 
grown as a food crop in the 18th century However unlike ｣ｯｵｮｴｲｾ･ｳ＠ such 
as Indonesia and the Philippines Thailand was always able to meet its 
starchy staple requirements solely through rice Cassava thus never 
became more than a speciality food ｾｮ＠ the country The genesis for growth 
ｾｮ＠ the crop has always been non-food markets almost solely directed to 
export The initial development of such a market was in the 1930 s when 
cassava pearl ｷ｡ｾＯ＠ produced in the South for export through ｍ｡ｬ｡ｹｳｾ｡＠
(Scheltema 1938) -
The Thai cassava industry was based on the starch export market up to 
about 1960 World War II briefly curtailed this market in Southeast Asia 
in the late 1940 s but following the war modern processing machinery was 
ｾｮｴｲｯ､ｵ｣･､＠ into Chonburi in the eastern region A healthy starch ｾｮ､ｵｳｴｲｹ＠
was operating in this region by the mid-1950' s ｳｵｰｰｬ｡ｮｴｾｮｧ＠ the starch 
industry in Indonesia and in the south of Thailand However it was starch 
wastes that became the basis for the real expansion in the crop when a 
Thai export statistics for cassava do not start until 1950 and the 
only suggestion of such an industry is Malaysian import statistics 
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West German importer in 1956 introduced cassava waste as an animal feed to 
Germany (Phillips 1974 Titapitnatanakun 1979) Low freight rates in 
this period its lack of alternative uses and high feedgrain prices in 
Germany made cassava waste particularly price competitive in Europe Since 
cassava waste was a by-product of starch manufacture shortages resulted and 
led to the importation of cassava meal starting in 1960 With the 
introduction of the Common Agricultura! Policy in 1962 and the favorable 
tariff binding on cassava in the 1968 GATT negotiat1ons the Thai cassava 
industry shifted to animal feed as its principal market Cassava chips 
became the dominant export in 1964 native pellets in 1969 and hard pellets 
in 1983 With this external stimulus Thailand went from a relat1vely minor 
producer of cassava in the 1950 s to the second largest (1f not the 
largest) producer of cassava in the world 
Production Trends 
Production of cassava has increased from around 400 thousand tons in 
the m1d-1950 s to almost 20 million tons in 1984/85 (Table 7 1) Th1s 
represents a sustained growth rate of 16% per annum for over 25 years 
These sharp increases in production have been based exclusively on 
expans1on in area planted and have been concentrated in a relat1vely 
limited number of regions within the country Production has continued to 
expand in the old starch producing region of Chonburi and Rayong However 
the bulk of cassava production has shifted from this zone to the Northeast 
Whereas the Northeast made up less than 10% of the total up to 1969 by 
1979 the Northeast was producing over 60% of total cassava Th1s 
represented a shift to relatively drier production conditions and a 
movement from the red-yellow podzolic soils to the more acidic latosols 
Cassava in part displaced kenaf in the Northeast and in part was planted on 
newly cleared forest areas 
Cassava has grown from a relatively minor crop in the 1950 s to be the 
second most important crop after rice in terms of production volume (as 
measured on a dry weight basis) and in terms of foreign exchange earned 
As in previous commod1ty booms rapid production increases have been based 
on area expansion led by demand in international markets Capacity and 
growth in domestic markets would never have sustained the growth rates that 
have occured in cassava and the other major agricultura! commodities To 
understand the cassava industry in Thailand the analysis first reviews the 
factors on the production side that formed the basis for such high growth 
rates and then turns to an analysis of the demand s1de which must 
necessarily consider the changing nature of international cassava markets 
Cassava Production Systems 
Agricultura! development in Thailand has been based on exploitation of 
an agricultura! frontier and reliance on international markets as a surplus 
vent Unlike Malaysia access to new land has been relatively 
uncontrolled although a ceil1ng on the s1ze of land holdings fomerly in 
the public domain was set at 8 ha in 1936 With the expansion in 
1nternational markets following World War II planted area expanded 
rapidly in many cases at the expense of forest lands A satellite census 
showed that forest land had been reduced from 57% of total land in 1961 to 
37% 1n 1974 a loss of 10 million hectares in 13 years (Bertrand 1980) 
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Whereas the pre-war expansion was based principally on rice for which 
there was already a large production base diversification into upland 
crops has been the hallmark of post-war agricultural growth Crops such as 
maize sugarcane mung bean kenaf and cassava have expanded rapidly from 
relatively small production bases The final component of this extensive 
growth pattern was relatively rapid mechanization of the agrLcultural 
sector based on either animal or mechanical equipment Thus in 1963 68k 
of farms were usLng animal traction and 147 were using mechanical power or 
some combination of animals and tractors By 1978 33% of farmers were 
utilizing tractors 
Cassava production systems therefore must be understood essentLally 
in the context of rapid expansion of previously uncultivated land 
Certainly in the Northeast there was some substitution for kenaf whose 
area by 1981 had declined by about 330 thousand hectares from its peak in 
1967 However cassava area in the Northeast increased by over 780 
thousand hectares in the same period at the same time as maize production 
also expanded quite dramatically Given cassava s adaptation to the drier 
growing conditions of the Northeast and the profit levels as maintained by 
EC grain prices the crop expanded rapidly principally by opening up new 
land The process obviously introduces a dynamic element into 
characterLzing cassava production systems especially in terms of 
adaptation of management practices as farmers learn the responsiveness of 
a new crop and the effects of continuous cassava cultivation on soil 
fertility 
Using the agricultural census of 1963 and 1978 as reference points 
cassava expansion was based on a sizeable increase in the number of cassava 
growing farms (from 58 to 450 thousand) and in an increase in the average 
size of cassava plantings per farm from 1 4 to 2 1 ha In 1978 21/ of the 
farmers Ln the Northeast grew cassava and in most instances probably 
depended on cassava as their principal source of income By 1978 the modal 
farm size stratum for cassava farmers was between 3 2 and 6 4 ha 
(Table 7 2) This is large by overall Asian standards but still relatively 
small given the agro-climatic potentLal of most growing areas Moreover 
such a farm size has supported a market for tractor hire servLces but not 
actual tractor ownership The adoption of tractor hire services has in 
turn released grazing land formerly needed to support draft animals for 
cultivation 
Given the very dynamic nature of the upland sector especially in the 
Northeast the degree of competition between cassava and other upland crops 
is diffLcult to define If crop area data are disaggregated by 
agroeconomic zone (Table 7 3) certain hypotheses at least emerge In the 
old cassava growing area of Chonburi and Rayong (agroeconomic zone 15) 
cassava made up 40% of total farm area with the only other upland crop 
being sugarcane Cassava dominates this zone so thoroughly that Lt appears 
blanketed by monoculture cassava In the Northeast the SLtuation is more 
diverse In agroeconomic zones 1 and 5 cassava potentially competes with 
maize and kenaf In agroeconomic zone 3 cassava competes only with kenaf 
In none of these latter zones does cassava domLnate the agricultural 
economy Moreover only in agroeconomic zone 5 do maize and cassava 
production ｡ｲ･ｳｾ＠ really overlap In the two largest maize producing zones 
only very little cassava LS produced In general in the Northeast there is 
TABLE 7 1 Thailand Cassava Area Production and Yields 1956-85 
Crop Year Are a Production Yield 
(000 ha) (000 t) (t/ha) 
1956-57 39 2 396 o 10 1 
1957-58 38 4 418 o 10 9 
1958-59 44 1 487 o 11 o 
1959-60 62 5 1 083 2 17 3 
1960-61 71 S 1 222 3 17 1 
1961-62 99 3 1 726 2 17 4 
1962-63 122 7 2 076 9 16 9 
1963-64 140 o 2 111 1 15 1 
1964-65 104 9 1 5S6 7 14 8 
196S-66 102 o 1 474 7 14 5 
1966-67 130 3 1 891 7 14 5 
1967-68 140 9 2 062 8 14 6 
1968-69 170 6 2 611 S 15 3 
1969-70 189 3 079 16 3 
1970-71 224 3 431 15 3 
1971-72 220 3 114 14 2 
1972-73 328 3 974 12 1 
1973-74 41S 5 443 13 1 
1974-75 497 6 76S 13 1 
1975-76 475 7 094 13 6 
1976-77 692 4 10 230 o 14 8 
1977-78 846 8 11 839 7 14 o 
1978-79 1 165 o 16 3S7 8 14 o 
1979-80 845 8 11 101 o 13 1 
1980-81 1 1S9 9 16 S40 o 14 3 
1981-82a 1 243 1 17 744 o 14 3 
1982-83 1 087 2 17 787 9 16 4 
1983-84 1 017 8 18 988 5 18 7 
1984-85 1 33S 1 19 985 3 15 o 
a Starting 1981-82 area figures changed from planted to harvested 
are a this caused an artificial rise in yield figures 
Source Center for Agricultural Statistics Office of Agricultural 
Econom1cs Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives 
TABLE 7 2 Thailand Distribution of Area Planted to Cassava by 
Farm Size 1978 
Farm Size Cassava Farmers Cassava Area 
Strata (ha) Number 
Less than 32 115 
3 1 o 26 213 
1 o - 1 6 29 770 
1 6 - 3 2 103 824 
3 2 - 6 4 167 328 
6 4 - 9 6 69 799 
9 6 - 22 4 48 523 
More than 22 4 4 759 
Total 450 331 
Source National Statistical Office 
Thailand Bangkok 
Percent Rectares Percent 
o 3 19 
5 8 13 429 1 4 
6 6 21 721 2 3 
23 1 112 212 11 9 
37 2 297 336 31 7 
15 5 192 920 20 5 
10 8 222 699 23 7 
1 o 78 732 8 4 
lOO O 939 069 lOO O 
1978 Agricultura! Census Report 
TABLE 7 3 Thailand The Relative Importance of Area Planted to Maize and Cassava by Agroeconomic Zone 
1974-78 
Cassava Maize 
Percent of Percent of Percent of 
Agroeconomic Percent of Cassava Total Maize 
Zone Are a Total Farm Area Are a Are a Farm Area Are a (000 ha) (000 ha) 
Northeast 
1 57 3 3 1 7 7 106 1 S 7 8 4 
2 8 2 o 8 1 1 3 8 o 4 o 3 
3 107 5 5 7 14 4 3 4 o 2 o 3 
4 53 4 3 5 7 1 31 o 2 o 2 4 
5 180 6 12 7 24 1 192 o 13 5 15 1 
North 
6 5 4 o 4 o 7 434 6 34 6 34 2 
8 12 2 1 1 1 6 107 2 9 4 8 4 
9 1 1 o 2 o 1 62 6 8 4 4 o 
10 1 6 o 2 o 2 26 4 4 o 2 1 
Central Plain 
7 3 8 o 6 o 5 259 S 38 7 20 4 
11 12 8 o 8 1 7 10 7 o 7 o 8 
12 19 4 2 6 2 6 13 4 1 8 1 o 
13 73 4 16 o 9 8 7 o 1 o o 6 
14 - - -
15 176 o 39 6 23 6 
16 28 2 12 6 3 8 5 8 2 6 o 5 
South 
17 3 7 o 3 o 5 6 1 o 4 o 5 
18 2 6 o 6 o 3 
19 1 4 o 5 o 2 
Total 748 6 6 1 100 o 1269 6 7 o 100 o 
Source Pongsrihadulchai Apichart Supply Analysis of Important Crops in Thailand 1981 
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still significant scope for expansJ.on of cassava area if not at the 
expense of other crops then in terms of currently under-utilized land 
already in farms or in the public domain 
The rainfall pattern in the Northeast and Central Plain is unimodal 
with a dry season from November to April and a wet season of varying 
intensity for the rest of the year as reflected in average annual rainfall 
for different sites from the Northeast to the South ranging from 900 to 
3000 mm Moreover moving to the Northeast rainfall becomes more variable 
and uncertain Since most of the cassava is solar dried this rainfall 
pattern creates a trade-off between optimum drying period and opt1.mum 
planting period The drying season starts in November and farmers rarely 
leave the cassava in the ground for longer than 12 months though it could 
be left much longer Where rainfall is more secure that is the Rayong and 
Chonburi area farmers plant in the dry season as well as the wet season 
Further to the northeast farmers tend to plant exclusively in the March to 
June period that is at the beginning of the rainy season (Figure 7 1) 
Experimental trails have shown that planting at the beginning of the rains 
gives significantly higher yields (Sinthuprama 1980) 
Given a eight-to-twelve month growth cycle planting in the 
November-December period and harvesting in the same perJ.od coincide better 
with market demand Prices are at their seasonal high in the 
September-November period befare declining to their seasonal low in 
March-April Also root starch content is much higher at the beginning of 
the dry season resultJ.ng in a further price premium There is greater 
demand for roots at this period because of the significant increase in 
through-put and thereby lower costs in the chipp1.ng plants due to shorter 
drying periods There is thus a significant increase in root sales in the 
dry season (Table 7 4) although harvest occurs throughout the year 
Cassava production systems in and of themselves are relatively 
simple The land J.s prepared either by animal traction or by tractor hire 
services with the latter being increasingly common The cassava is planted 
either horizontally (sandy soJ.ls) or vertically (loamy soils) depending on 
the potential drought risk of the soil Planting material comes from 
recently harvested plants keeping stake storage time to a minimum 
Cassava is grown in a very strict monoculture system in that no other crop 
species are interplanted and a single variety tends to dominate throughout 
Thailand Rayong 1 In weeding hand labor is employed with some animal 
interrow cultivation Nevertheless in the these activities labor use is 
kept to the minimum necessary to adequately maintain the crop 
The most critical issue J.n the rapid expansion of cassava production 
and the resultant extensJ.ve production systems is the maintenance of soil 
fertility In general fertilJ.Zer application is low in Thailand when 
compared to other Asian c2yntries Fertilizer prices are not consJ.stently 
subsidized in Thailand - and are generally applied to those crops in 
which margJ.nal returns are highest Of the maJar crops sugarcane has the 
'!) There are some programs 
purchase of fertilizer 
rice 
which provide a credJ.t subsidy for the 
These programs are ｰｾｩｭ｡ｲｩｬｹ＠ orJ.ented to 
TABLE 7 4 Thailand Percentage Distribution of Monthly Farmer Sales of Cassava Roots during 
the Crop year 1973 and 1984 
North Northeast Central Thailand 
1973 1984 1973 1984 1973 1984 1973 1984 
Oct - o 4 7 9 12 4 9 o 6 4 8 1 10 2 
Nov 
- - 4 3 8 4 7 4 16 1 5 8 9 6 
Dec - - 2 7 8 1 12 9 12 2 7 9 8 5 
Jan - 4 6 5 7 15 2 3 9 15 5 4 5 14 5 
Feb - 44 1 19 8 24 1 7 9 27 3 12 8 26 2 
Mar - 47 o 14 9 17 o 20 4 13 5 17 1 18 4 
April - 1 8 14 5 4 2 8 o 6 o 9 2 4 4 
May - 2 o 5 5 1 8 5 2 1 5 5 1 1 7 
June - - 9 9 o 4 6 7 o 4 7 8 o 4 
July 
- -
7 5 3 6 5 o o 3 8 7 2 6 
Aug - - 5 4 4 1 6 1 o 1 6 8 3 o 
Sept 
- -
4 8 o 7 7 6 o 9 6 1 o 6 
Source Center for Agricultura! Statistics Office of Agricultura! Economcis Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives Bangkok 
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highest application rate followed by rice According to the 1978 census 
rice consumes fully two-thirds of fertilizer availabilities Sugarcane 
vegetable and tree crops consume an ｡､､ｩｴｾｯｮ｡ｬ＠ quarter leaving less than 
104 or less than 70 thousand tons available for all other major field 
crops 
ｆ･ｲｴｩｬｾｺ･ｲ＠ ｡ｰｰｬｾ｣｡ｴｩｯｮ＠ on cassava ｾｳ＠ low In 1973/74 average 
fertilizer application per cultivated hectare of cassava was only 6 9 
kg/ha (Koomsup 1980) On that area where ｦ･ｲｴｾｬｩｺ･ｲ＠ was actually ｡ｰｰｬｾ･､＠
(16% of cultivated area) rates were 43 kg/ha Recommended application 
rates are about 15 times this level By 1980/81 average application rates 
remained at the same level (Table 7 S) As would be expected fertilizer 
application is much higher in the old production zones around Chonburi and 
Rayong while in many areas of the Northeast fertilizer use on cassava is 
ｮｯｮＭ･ｸｾｳｴ･ｮｴ＠ The very low fertilizer use in cassava raises two critica! 
issues First has continuous cassava ｣ｵｬｴｩｶ｡ｴｾｯｮ＠ with only minimal levels 
of ｦ･ｲｴｾｬｩｺ･ｲ＠ use resulted in a declining yield trend? Second what would 
be the yield gains were ｦ･ｲｴｾｬｩｺ･ｲ＠ application to ｾｮ｣ｲ･｡ｳ･＿＠ To answer 
partially these issues the analysis turns to an evaluation of cassava 
yields 
Yields 
Average cassava yield levels of 13 to 14 t/ha in Thailand are high 
even by Asian standards Only India and Malaysia consistently have higher 
yields than Thailand Moreover Thailand has been able to maintain this 
level of productivity through the period of ｲ｡ｰｾ､＠ expansion in the crop 
The ｮ｡ｴｾｯｮ｡ｬ＠ ｳｴ｡ｴｩｳｴｾ｣ｳ＠ suggest that yields have declined somewhat ｳｾｮ｣･＠
1960 In the early sixties average yields were around 17 t/ha and declined 
ｱｵｾｴ･＠ rapidly to 14 t/ha by the late ｳｩｸｴｾ･ｳ＠ Yields have remained at 
about this level ever since having fallen below 13 t/ha only once These 
relatively high yields have been a significant part of Thailand s dominance 
of the international trade in cassava 
The difference in ｡ｧｲｯＭ｣ｬｩｭ｡ｴｾ｣＠ conditions between the Northeast and 
the Central Plain is only partially reflected in yield differences The 
older production ｲ･ｧｾｯｮｳ＠ on average maintain a one-to-two ton yield 
advantage over ｰｲｯ､ｵ｣ｴｾｯｮ＠ areas in the Northeast However yields have 
shown something of a rising trend in the Northeast especially if extended 
back to 1960 Yield trends ｾｮ＠ the Central Plain on the other hand 
initially declined in the 1960's and over the past half decade have been 
remarkably stable at around 15 t/ha Yield levels as expressed in the 
aggregate production ｳｴ｡ｴｾｳｴｩ｣ｳ＠ thus present a picture of relative 
stability and give no indication of progressive soil exhaustion 
The micro-leve! data are only ｳｵｧｧ･ｳｴｾｶ･＠ of the factors underlying the 
dynamics of cassava productivity To start ｷｾｴｨ＠ average yields of cassava 
mask a very ｷｾ､･＠ yield ､ｩｳｰ･ｲｳｾｯｮ＠ The yield distribution is skewed with 
the largest segment of farmers producing quite normal yields by world 
standards of from zero to nine t/ha and with a very extended right-hand 
side where some farmers produce over 19 t/ha (Table 7 6) The second set 
of data is long-term ｦ･ｲｴｾｬｩｴｹ＠ studies (Figure 7 2) These data show the 
expected ､･｣ｬｾｮ･＠ in ｹｾ･ｬ､ｳ＠ with continuous ｣ｲｯｰｰｾｮｧ＠ after openi"lg up new 
land However the decline is gradual and in one site yields only declined 
TABT..E 7 S 
Agroeconomic 
Zone 
Northeast 
1 
2 
3 
4 
S 
Thailand 
Central Plain 
7 
11 
12 
13 
1S 
16 
Average Fertilizer Application 
Rates on Total Cultivated Area 
1980-81 
b Application Rate 
(kg/ha) 
2 2 
1 7 
1 9 
o 7 
o 6 
4 ｾ＠
3 7 a 
a 
b 
The survey shows quite high average application 
rates for organic fertilizers 
Fertilizer expenditures by farmers were divided by 
an average fertilizer price of Baht S 1/kg 
Source Survey of Cassava Production Costs and Returns 
1980-81 Office of Agricultura! Economics 
Ministry of Agriculture and Coooperatives 1982 
TABLE 7 6 Thailand Distribution of Cassava Yields 1974-75 
Yield Leve! 
(t/ha) 
o to 9 4 
9 4 to 12 5 
12 5 to 15 6 
15 6 to 18 8 
More than 18 8 
Source Phillips Truman 
1977 
Chonburi Rayong 
Nakhonrachsima 
35 7 
20 6 
21 4 
10 1 
12 2 
Percent of Farmers 
Other 
Changwats 
31 1 
23 1 
14 o 
17 8 
14 o 
Thailand 
33 2 
21 9 
17 4 
14 3 
13 2 
A Profile of Thai Cassava Production Practices 
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from around 30 t/ha to 20 t/ha in a sixteen year period One thorough 
study found that from an initial yield of 20 to 30 t/ha yields decrease by 
half within 9 to 20 years (lnterim Committee for Coordination of 
Investigations in the Lower Mekong Basin 1979) With such rapid opening 
of new land as has occurred in the case of cassava the yield decline in 
older plots has been offset by the higher yields of new ｰｲｯ､ｵ｣ｴｾｯｮ＠ areas 
As yield in older plots fall cassava supply becomes more sensitive to 
price changes particularly since more than half the farmers operate at 
below average yields 
Mining of soil fertility has a longer-term social cost of enhanced 
erosion potential and a permanent decline in the productivity of the land 
resource This therefore puts prime importance on motivating increased 
｡ｰｰｬｩ｣｡ｴｾｯｮ＠ of organic and inorganic fertilizers as apparently already is 
happening in the Chonburi and Rayong area Two factors however 
complicate increased use of fertilizer on cassava First in most areas 
cassava must compete with either rice or sugarcane for capital resources 
for fertilizer Second cassava responsiveness to ｦ･ｲｴｩｬｾｺ･ｲ＠ application 
is not as certain as in these other two crops There is often no response 
in the first two to three years after opening up new land (Table 7 7) 
After that while responses can be shown they cannot be demonstrated 
consistently (Table 7 8) 
What remains extraordinary in Thailand is the ｨｾｧｨ＠ yields that farmers 
achieve in even depleted soils Suttibursaya and Kummarohita (1978) report 
cassava being grown continuously for 25 years without ｦ･ｲｴｾｬｩｺ｡ｴｩｯｮ＠ and yet 
yields have ､･｣ｬｾｮ･､＠ to only 16-17 t/ha A fertility restoration 
experiment selected four farmers fields which had been continously 
cultivated for 15 years and the average yield of the check plots was 21 
t/ha (lnterim Committee for Coordination of Investigations in the Lower 
Mekong Basin 1979) This suggests that the dominant ｶ｡ｲｾ･ｴｹ＠ Rayong 1 is 
very efficient in the utilization of limited soil ｮｵｴｲｾ･ｮｴｳ＠ Moreover 
thirty years of experimental work both on the experiment station and in 
farmers fields suggest that 30 t/ha is an achievable target with an 
appropriate ｦ･ｲｴｩｬｾｺ･ｲ＠ regime 
The results have made fertility management the ｰｲｾｮ｣ｾｰ｡ｬ＠ research 
thrust in cassava ｾｮ＠ Thailand What is the advantage of a large investment 
in breeding if 30 t/ha is imminently achievable with the current ｶ｡ｲｾ･ｴｹ＿＠
However defining a recommendation that gives a consistently profitable 
response has eluded researchers and inhibited adoption of fertilizer use in 
cassava Indeed farmers in Thailand utilize fertilizer they however do 
not apply it to their cassava Until the profitabilHy of fert1lizer 
response can be ｳｩｧｮｩｦｾ｣｡ｮｴｬｹ＠ increased probably by linking application 
rates to other environmental variables no effective extension program for 
ｦ･ｲｴｩｬｾｺ｡ｴｩｯｮ＠ of cassava will be successful except possibly in the very 
badly degraded soils such as now exist in Chonburi and Rayong 
Thus the relatively high prices for cassava products obtained ｾｮ＠ the 
European Community was only part of the profit engine that resulted in the 
rapid expansion in cassava area The other component was the very high 
initial yields obtained by new adopters of cassava ｣ｵｬｴｾｶ｡ｴｩｯｮ＠ ｉｮｩｴｾ｡ｬ＠
yields in ｴｾ･＠ 25 to 30 t/ha range provided a powerful stimulus to expand 
cassava area and lack of a viable crop alternative kept farmers in cassava 
However this raises the question of the longer term viability of cassava 
TABLE 7 7 Thailand Cassava Yields in Long-term Fertilizer Experiments at Rayong 1964-70 
Year 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
a 
b 
e 
Yearly 
Yearly 
Yearly 
First Site 
Zero Low a Medium b 
Fertilizer Application Application 
(t/ha) (t/ha) ( t/ha) 
32 5 29 4 29 4 
22 5 22 5 21 3 
20 o 22 5 18 8 
14 4 26 3 28 1 
21 3 31 3 28 7 
22 5 29 4 28 7 
19 o 36 o 
application of 50-50-25 kg/ha of N P and K 
application of 75-75-120 kg/ha of N P and K 
applicaton of 50-50-50 kg/ha of N P and k 
Zero 
Fertilizer 
(t/ha) 
25 o 
23 8 
23 1 
22 5 
17 5 
Second Site 
a Low 
Application 
(t/ha) 
25 6 
18 8 
26 3 
26 9 
21 3 
Source Interim Committee for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin 
Agricultura! Research Efficiency in Thailand Volume III Cassava 1979 
e Medium 
Application 
(t/ha) 
25 o 
20 o 
31 3 
31 3 
25 6 
TABT..E 7 8 Thailand Summary of 121 Fertilizer Trials Across Three 
Different Soil Types 1968-70 
Probabill.ty of Response 
Soil Series No of Trials N p 
Huai Pong 14 + 
Pattaya 25 + 
Sattahip 82 ++ + 
a The probabilities are as follows 
- not probable 
+ probable 
+ fairly probable 
++ highly probable 
( < 25% of trials showed response) 
(25-49% of trials showed response) 
(50-67% of trials showed response) 
( ') 6 7% of trials showed response) 
to 
Source Sittibusaya 
Fertilization 
Chote and K Kurmarohita 
1978 
Soil Fertility and 
a 
K 
+ 
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as the industry stabilizes as overall yields decline to a low level 
equilibrium and as output pr1ces come under downward pressure The task is 
to transform a dynamic industry that has been fueled by private costs 
being lower than social costs to a sustainable industry where farmers must 
pay the full cost of soil nutrient extraction 
Costs of Production and Labor Utilization 
As yields decline the farmer's in1tial means of maintaining profits 
are by reducing costs By Asian standards cassava production systems in 
Thailand are relatively extensive in terms of labor and input use which in 
turn reflects the relatively high land-labor ratio existent in the country 
Moreover the existing agricultural frontier and the relatively liberal 
land policy have further reinforced extens1ve production practices The 
process has thus favored technologies that substitute for labor rather than 
those that substitute for land 
Labor is the major cost component in cassava production systems 
Estimates of labor input per hectare range from 70 to 100 man days Only 
maize and broadcast rice have a lower labor input (Table 7 9) 
Additionally because cassava can be planted almost anytime of the year and 
can be harvested over a relatively long period labor activities can be 
scheduled 1n relation to other demands for labor S1nce upland crops must 
compete with rice for labor this flexib1lity in labor use gives cassava an 
advantage over other upland crops Finally cassava gives the highest 
average returns per manday of labor input (Boobst et al ) Cassava thus is 
very well adapted to the labor economy of Thailand----
The trend is toward further reductions in labor input Land 
preparation through tractors has rapidly spread through the Northeast 
With movement to planting in rows interrow cultivation with animals was 
employed in those areas that still maintained draft animals Increases in 
sales of herbicides have been reported in the maJor cassava producing area 
of Chonburi especially since there were no such sales prior to 1973 
(Inter1m Committee for Coordination of the Lower Mechong Basin 1979) 
Thus farmers have been very responsive to technolog1es that have 
substHuted for labor they have not been responsive in the adoption of 
land substituting technology 
Labor or mechanization costs make up over 85/ of total cassava 
production costs (Table 7 10) Input and fixed costs make up the 
remainder Moreover normally about half of production costs are paid in 
cash the rest reflects the opportun1ty costs (evaluated at market prices) 
of farmer-owned resources The cost structure reflects some flexibility in 
absorb1ng price declines at least in the short-run since price declines 
can be absorbed in terms of lower returns on farmer-owned resources MaJor 
increases in fertilizer costs would sign1ficantly shift this balance again 
highlighting the importance of a consistent yield response for adoption 
Supply Response 
The 
over the 
crop was 
reasons behind the rap1d expansion in 
last two decades can now be summarized 
very prof1table During the 1974-1984 
cassava area in Thailand 
First and foremost the 
per1od average returns to 
TABLE 7 9 Thailand 
Crop 
Rice 
Cassava 
Kenaf 
Peanuts 
Rainy season 
Cool season 
Dry season 
Vegetables 
Average Labor Requirements and Returns by Crop 
Enterprise Northeast 1973-74 
Labor Requirements 
(Man-Days/Hectare) 
87 56 
lOO 65 
161 36 
161 78 
112 67 
155 60 
772 os 
Returns per Man-Day Net of 
Nonlabor Variable Costs 
(Do llar /Man-Da y) 
1 18 
2 02 
o 55 
1 08 
o 93 
1 24 
o 48 
Source Bobst Barry et al 
in Northeast Thailand 
Enterprise Selection and Farm Employment 
1980 
Table 7 10 Thailand 
Cost Item 
Variable Costs 
Labor Costs 
Land Preparation 
Man 
Oxen 
Tractor 
Seed Selection 
Planting 
Weeding 
Man 
Oxen 
Harvesting 
Transporting 
Man 
Oxen 
Tractor 
Input Costs 
Stakes 
Agr Equipment 
Gasoline and Oil 
Chemical Fertilizer 
Other Costs 
Repa1r Agr Equip 
Working Capital 
Fixed Costs 
Land use 
Average per Rectare Costs of Production of Cassava 
Roots Northeast 1980-81 
Cash 
(Baht/ha) 
2810 6 
2590 1 
1875 3 
58 6 
52 9 
921 6 
8 7 
251 5 
575 6 
1 8 
572 1 
69 1 
2 6 
71 o 
207 o 
134 1 
26 1 
26 o 
20 8 
18 3 
58 o 
58 o 
Non-Cash 
(Baht/ha) 
2054 3 
1290 6 
882 9 
97 6 
93 5 
65 8 
31 3 
154 8 
439 1 
334 6 
72 6 
o 5 
242 o 
242 o 
521 8 
Total 
(Baht/ha) 
4864 9 
3880 7 
2758 2 
156 1 
146 4 
987 4 
39 9 
406 3 
1014 6 
1 8 
906 8 
141 6 
3 1 
71 o 
449 o 
376 1 
26 1 
26 o 
20 8 
18 3 
521 8 
Depreciation Agr Equip 
673 2 
647 5 
25 7 
731 2 
705 5 
25 7 
Total Cost 
Cost per ton (Baht/t) 
Price (Baht/t) 
2868 6 2726 6 5595 2 
406 
510 
Source Survey of Cassava Product1on Costs and Returns 1980-81 Off1ce 
of Agricultura! Economics Min1stry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives 1982 
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cassava never dropped below 25% and were as high as 145% (Table 7 11) 
Second the kenaf industry was in decline and even further land was 
available on which to expand Given the high yields on uncultivated land 
cassava as an income source was unmatched and led to a majar increase in 
incomes in the relatively depressed area of the Northeast Third farmers 
did not face a labor constraint as tractor hire services expanded rapidly 
in the cassava producing areas 
All of these factors are reflected in cassava supply response 
Pongsrihandulchai (1981) has estimated supply equations for cassava by 
agro-economic zone and as might be expected found a very high short-run 
price elasticity of between O 58 to 2 78 (the median was 1 77) Price 
responsiveness in cassava was much higher than in rice (O 27) maize 
(O 70) kenaf (O 87) or sugarcane (O 62) Moreover the supply equations 
suggested that cassava principally competed for land with kenaf except in 
the Rayong-Chonburi region where there were no competing crops with 
cassava These equations were estimated while cassava prices were on the 
whole increasing The question arises whether farmers would be equally 
responsive to declining prices and the answer would probably be no There 
is limited effective competition between cassava and other crops 
reflecting few other cropping alternatives for land in cassava Farmers 
would only sign1ficantly reduce area if they were operating at a cash loss 
Technology Development 
Research on cassava in Thailand started 1n 1956 with the creation of 
the Huai Pong Experiment Station in Rayong The station comes under the 
Field Crop Division of the Department of Agr1culture and since 1956 has 
beeen the principal locus of cassava research although research on other 
field crops is also done at the station As research on cassava has 
increased with the expansion in the crop other field crop research 
stations in the northeast have also conducted exper1mental work on cassava 
all of which is coordinated by the Root Crops Branch within the Field Crop 
Division of the Department of Agriculture 
For the first two decades cassava research focused on soil management 
and fertil1zation (see Sittibursaya and Kurmardrita 1978 for a summary of 
this research) The principal features of this work are well summarized by 
the Committee for the Lower Mekong Basin (1979) namely high yearly y1eld 
fluctuat1ons probably related to rainfall conditions rapidly declining 
yields of unfert1lized plots and variable response to fert1lizers While 
the research has led to a set of fertilizer recommendations broken down by 
soil type and while a series of farm level demonstration trials were also 
carried out only minor adopt1on of fert1lizer has occurred Some research 
in this area continues to be done even though it follows virtually the 
same approach The few deviations have been toward evaluat1on of green and 
organic manures These have shown prom1sing results (Table 7 12) but have 
not led to any recommendations 
Lack of progress in the area of fertilization gave impetus to the 
development of a var1etal improvement program Local clones were collected 
in 1956 These were evaluated for agronomic characters and yielding 
ability but were found not to show significant differences One was 
selected and named Rayong 1 wh1ch was used as a check variety in all 
TABLE 7 11 Thailand Average Costs of Production and Returns for Cassava 1974-1983 
Per Hectare Costs Per Hectare Per Ton Farm 
Crop Year Cash Non-Cash Total Yield Cost Price a 
(Baht/ha) (Baht/t) (Baht/ha) (t/ha) (Bath/t) (Bath/t) 
1974-75 1593 1558 3151 13 o 242 4 290 
1975-76 1854 1674 3528 13 7 256 9 410 
1976-77 1701 2390 4091 12 6 325 6 460 
1977-78 1696 2116 3812 12 9 294 9 450 
1978-79 2059 2089 4148 14 9 282 6 370 
1979-80 2217 2227 4444 10 7 415 9 770 
1980-81 3114 2757 5871 14 3 411 8 750 
1981-82 2820 3221 6041 14 o 432 4 450 
1982-83 3399 3018 6417 13 9 446 o 540 
a Average price for the crop year Oct-Sept 
Source Production Economic Section Office of Agricultural Economics Ministry of Agricultura 
and Cooperativas Bangkok 
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succeeding experimental work While some selection from collected 
open-pollinated seed started in 1971 a controlled hybridization program 
did not begin till 1974 (Sinthruprama 1978) Initial crosses were between 
Rayong 1 and other local cultivara In 1977 varieties from CIAT were 
introduced as well as seed from controlled hybridization This served to 
s1gnificantly expand the germplasm on which the crossing program was based 
Initial selection is based on high root yield and high starch content 
In later evaluations earliness and appropriate plant type for intercropping 
are introduced as selection characteristics Promising materials are 
evaluated for drought tolerance resistance to the few cassava diseases and 
pests that occur in Thailand and in some cases for edible quality 
characteristics A testing program of regional and on-farm trials resulted 
in the release in 1983 of the first promising variety Rayong 3 Ita 
principal advantages over Rayong 1 are a higher starch content and a higher 
response to chemical fertilizer As yet it is too early to evaluate the 
adoption of this variety 
New production technology has not been necessay to the rapid expansion 
in cassava cultivation The high yields obtained with the local variety as 
new land was cultivated and the high prices set by the European Community 
were sufficient to maintain high profits in cassava cultivation These 
profit levels are now coming under pressure from two sources the 
decreasing yields as soil fertility declines and uncertain access to the 
European Community as the EC attempts to reduce cassava imports The 
latter will require lower price levels as Thailand looks to alternative 
international markets which in turn will result in a cost-price squeeze at 
the farm level effectively increasing the demand for improved technology 
The research program is in a position where a new variety in and of 
itself will not have a high probability of markedly 1mproving yields 
This will occur only if the variety is combined with a viable soil 
fertility management strategy The first signs of farmer adoption of 
fertihzer are occurring in the old production areas of Chomburi and 
Rayong Motivating this trend will provide the base for yield ga1ns though 
new varieties 
Markets and Demand 
The development of the Thai cassava economy (together with that of 
Malaysia) has followed the reverse of the normal pattern That is growth 
in production was initially driven by export market development Only 
after export market channels were well in place did domestic markets of any 
size begin to develop Price formation was always based on cassava as a 
tradeable good in international markets and Thai farmers and cassava 
processors based their dec1sions on price 1ncent1ves set in these markets 
An analysis of the Thai cassava economy in thus dependent on an evaluation 
of cassava demand in international markets (see Chapter VIII) and of price 
format1on in these markets 
The Cassava Pellet Export Market 
The export market for cassava chips and pellets dominates the Thai 
cassava economy High grain prices in Europe first in West Germany and 
TABLE 7 12 Thailand Yield Effect of 
Various Green Manure Crops 
on Succeeding Crop of 
Cassava 1970 
Treatment 
Crotalaria JUncea 
Dolichos biflorus 
Vigna sinensis 
Phaseolus mungo 
Phaseolus calcaratus 
N-P-K (50-50-25) 
No green manure 
Yie1d 
(t/ha) 
26 8 
29 6 
32 2 
27 3 
25 5 
27 3 
20 4 
Source Inter1ma Committee for Coordina-
tion of Investigation of the 
Lower Mekong Basin Agricul-
tura! Research Effic1ency in 
Thailand Cassava 1979 
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later ｷｾｴｨｩｮ＠ the larger EEC have provided the ｧ･ｮ･ｳｾｳ＠ for ｔｨ｡ｾ＠ chip and 
pellet exports These markets have been able to absorb the rapid expansion 
in export volumes to the extent that Thailand has not had to diversify its 
markets that is uptil 1983 Thai success however has given rise to 
European discontent and in 1982 a agreement for voluntary export restraint 
was negotiated and signed between the two parties (a lengthy discussion of 
the structure of the European market of the history of cassava imports 
into Europe and of the details of the quota is found in Chapter VIII) The 
quota while slowing growth in Thai exports nevertheless has not stopped 
it completely (Table 7 13) 
The pattern of growth in the Thai cassava industry is relatively 
unique when compared to cases of rapid expansion in other agricultural 
commodities especially the ｧｲ｡ｾｮｳ＠ The difference comes in the fact that 
cassava has to be processed very close to the production ｰｯｾｮｴ＠ because of 
its bulkiness and rapid perishability Sugar cane and palm ｯｾｬ＠ have 
similar characteristics and in their case relatively large scale processing 
units have usually been linked to core plantations though if properly 
planned smallholders can provide a ｣･ｲｴ｡ｾｮ＠ percentage of the raw material 
production However in the case of cassava the expansion in root 
production and processing has been based on ｬｩｮｫｾｮｧ＠ small-scale producers 
to relatively small-scale processing capacity Decentralized small-scale 
processing is thus a solution to the problem of ｭｩｮｩｭｾｺｩｮｧ＠ transport costs 
where in the case of sugar cane or palm oil the solution is ｰｬ｡ｮｴ｡ｴｾｯｮｳ＠
Moreover growth ｾｮ＠ production can be more easily syncronized with needed 
investment in processing capacity This is typical of cassava development 
other examples are gari in West Africa and farinha de mandioca ｾｮ＠ ｂｲ｡ｺｾｬ＠
This development pattern allows cassava both to maintain a small-farm 
focus to maximize the employment generation in production and processing 
and to distribute more equitably income growth as the industry expands 
The development of investment in processing capacity is portrayed in 
Table 7 14 The data suggest a pattern that first depends on concentration 
of investment in a few limited areas About 78% of all chipping plants in 
1973 were located in only four changwats 60% were located in only two 
Rayong in the Central Plain and Nakhon ｒ｡ｴ｣ｨ｡ｳｾｭ｡＠ in the Northeast By 
1978 these same four changwats accounted for JUSt 417 of all chipping 
plants Root ｰｲｯ､ｵ｣ｴｾｯｮ＠ followed much the same organic growth process 
That is development of the industry was based ｩｮｾｴｩ｡ｬｬｹ＠ on the 
･ｳｴ｡｢ｬｾｳｨｭ･ｮｴ＠ of growth nodes where increasing ､･ｮｳｾｴｹ＠ of production made 
for a more efficient cassava root market This concentration in turn 
allowed the orderly evolution of market channels to the export points By 
1978 the next phase in ｴｨｾｳ＠ growth process ｾｳ＠ apparent i e rapid 
expansion of processing capacity into other changwats especially in the 
Northeast and expansion in processing scale in those original areas where 
ｰｲｯ､ｵ｣ｴｾｯｮ＠ density had reached a certain critical point such that transport 
costs were not a constraint on scale expansion A certain production 
density is necessary to support efficient large-scale cassava processing 
This organic development of the ｔｨ｡ｾ＠ cassava ｾｮ､ｵｳｴｲｹ＠ has induced a 
continual search for cost reductions especially in processing storage and 
transport In the 1960 s this was policy induced as the EEC varied its 
tariff rates en meal versus chips (see Chapter VIII) The binding of the 
duty in 1968 provided the market security to JUStify investments leading to 
other cost reductions The first large ｾｮｶ･ｳｴｭ･ｮｴｳ＠ came in the form of 
TABLE 7 13 Thailand Exports of Cassava Products ｄ･ｳｴｾｮ･､＠ for Animal 
Feed Use 1960-83 
Year Chips Me al Pellets Waste Total 
(000 t) (000 t) (000 t) (000 t) (000 t) 
1960 3 o 64 6 25 ü 93 6 
1961 8 4 188 4 18 6 215 4 
1962 12 7 267 7 9 6 290 o 
1963 93 4 189 8 22 4 305 6 
1964 339 4 202 3 45 5 587 2 
1965 400 5 79 o 97 8 577 3 
1966 359 8 65 8 107 9 533 5 
1967 337 4 174 8 70 2 582 4 
1968 323 2 388 8 33 1 853 7 
1969 56 4 27 7 752 7 16 9 1 181 9 
1970 8 1 4 o 1 163 9 5 9 972 1 
1971 2 5 1 5 963 9 4 2 1 181 6 
1972 2 4 o 6 1 177 4 1 2 1 659 o 
1973 18 2 o 6 1 638 7 1 5 2 139 6 
1974 105 3 1 o 2 031 5 1 8 2 240 5 
1975 70 6 2 168 7 1 2 3 484 9 
1976 43 4 o 2 3 441 3 3 752 9 
1977 65 6 o 5 3 686 7 o 1 6 052 3 
1978 255 6 o 2 5 796 1 o 4 6 052 3 
1979 142 o o 4 3 695 8 o 3 3 838 5 
1980 159 2 2 7 4 811 2 4 973 1 
1981 334 4 o 6 5 620 2 o 6 5 955 8 
1982 523 1 9 7 6 892 8 o 5 7 426 1 
1983 280 o 4 8 4 545 1 o 3 4 830 2 
Source Center for Agricultural ｓｴ｡ｴｩｳｴｾ｣ｳ＠ Office of Agricultural 
Economics Ministry of ａｧｲｾ｣ｵｬｴｵｲ･＠ and Cooperatives Bangkok 
'OO!LE 7 14 Tha.i1m1d Evolution of Processing Capacity for Cassava Chlps and Pellets by ｾｴ＠ 1973-85 
Chlp Pellet 
ｾｴ＠ 1973 1978 1985 1973 1978 1985 
(rumber) (rumber) ( OOJ t capacity) (rumber) (number) ( 00) t cap<1 
North 88 95 900 lO 24 2312 4 
JCarrvbaeng Phet 80 35 24 3 6 5 360 o 
Nakhon Sawan 5 34 18 4 1 10 943 2 
Ch:!ang Rai 10 7 1 1 
Phitsarrulok 6 35 5 2 4 345 6 
Uthai Thani 2 4 o 1 1 2 532 8 
Northeast 421 1 777 7 860 7 24 305 20 736 o 
Kalasin 36 159 625 o 2 5 381 6 
Klnn Kaen 252 7750 58 4 406 4 
Chaiyaphum 2 41 632 5 17 10440 
Nakhon Phancm 6 28 172 3 1 7 871 2 
Nakhon Ratchasima 356 617 3 934 2 10 114 7 855 2 
Buri Ram 4 108 543 7 4 21 1 036 8 
Maha Sarakharm 1 60 284 3 23 396 o 
Roi Et 3 97 221 1 7 475 2 
Nong Khai 1 45 203 4 2 9 410 4 
Udon Thani 4 18 234 1 3 235 1 540 8 
Surin 24 222 10 1 483 2 
Central Plain 641 1 375 1 812 3 141 287 19 843 5 
Kanchanaburi 25 58 63 9 4 5 158 4 
Suphan Buri 29 62 47 9 4 8 828 o 
01achengsao 40 134 315 8 29 3 420 o 
Chon Buri 113 348 991 2 115 126 8 553 6 
Trat 27 58 21 8 15 6 
Prachin Buri 32 230 120 4 33 1 785 6 
Rayong 345 328 176 6 11 62 2 368 8 
Total Tha.i1m1d 1 152 3 254 13 698 175 618 42 892 
Source Division of Factory Control and Industrial Economics Ministry of Industrv Bangkok 
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pelleting capacity The obJective here was to reduce transport costs by 
increasing the density (Table 7 15) These were first based on the 
importation of European pelleters but this was shortly followed by the 
manufacture of pelleting machines in ｔｨ｡ｾｬ｡ｮ､＠ This gave ｲｾｳ･＠ to a quality 
distinction of brand versus native pellets with the latter having a lower 
density being softer and not having a pure composition (Mathot 197 4 
explores in detail the ｴ･｣ｨｮｾ｣｡ｬ＠ and economic factors determining pellet 
quality in Thailand) 
ａ｣｣ｯｲ､ｾｮｧ＠ to export statistics Thailand converted from exporting mea! 
and ｣ｨｾｰｳ＠ in 1968 to exporting virtually all pellets ｾｮ＠ 1969 that ｾｳ＠ 750 
thousand tons Reports suggest the first pelleters were established in 
1967 Investment in pelleting capacity was thus rapid and was independent 
of chip processing Investment in ｰ･ｬｬ･ｴｾｮｧ＠ ｲ･ｬｾ･､＠ on a ｳｩｧｮｩｦｾ｣｡ｮｴ＠ chip 
production capacity and a ｭ｡ｲｧｾｮ＠ defined by transport cost advantages both 
internally and in the export trade Nevertheless pelleting plants were 
not large A 1974/75 survey identified three types of plants a 
small-scale plant with an annual capacity of 1260 tons a medium-scale 
plant producing 3310 tons and large-scale plants with a ｣｡ｰ｡｣ｾｴｹ＠ of 7280 
tons (Titapiwatanakun 1979) ｉｮｴ･ｲ･ｳｴｾｮｧｬｹ＠ these were not much larger 
than the average production capacity of chip plants and thus suggest no 
economies of scale in pelleting That is since chipping and drying gets 
over the perishability and transport ｣ｯｮｳｴｲ｡ｾｮｴ＠ and since chip ｰｲｯ､ｵ｣ｴｾｯｮ＠
was relatively concentrated any economies of scale in pelleting would have 
suggested ｾｮｶ･ｳｴｭ･ｮｴ＠ in larger centralized plants 
There were no ･｣ｯｮｯｭｾ･ｳ＠ of scale in native pellets however for hard 
pellets produced with steam and/or a vegetable oil binder scale economies 
did seem to exist The cost savings on the ｵｴｾｬｩｺ｡ｴｩｯｮ＠ side in hard 
pellets are three First density is greater so there is a transport 
savings Second for feed concentrate manufacturera hard pellets do not 
require as much modification ｾｮ＠ factory transport systems i e essentially 
adapted for grains Third hard pellets can be stored longer allowing 
fewer storage losses Also there was a significant decline in dust 
pollution which previously had remained an externality and was dealt with 
by public funds in ports such as Rotterdam The price ､ｾｦｦ･ｲ･ｮｴｩ｡ｬ＠
ｲ･ｳｵｬｴｾｮｧ＠ from these savings however was through the 1970 s never 
ｳｵｦｦｾ｣ｩ･ｮｴ＠ to motivate a larger production of hard or brand pellets Most 
majar cassava users ｾｮ＠ Europe especially ｾｮ＠ the Netherlands made the 
necessary investments to handle the higher meal content of native pellets 
in the feed plants and the ports 
Investment in hard pelleting capacity started to ｾｮ｣ｲ･｡ｳ･＠ in 1982 at 
the start of the quota and by 1985 over 804 of pellet exports were in the 
form of hard pellets What is ｾｲｯｮｩ｣｡ｬ＠ ｾｳ＠ that ｾｮｶ･ｳｴｭ･ｮｴ＠ came at a time 
when prospects ｾｮ＠ the EEC market were very uncertain Two factors prompted 
ｴｨｾｳ＠ conversion First the quota resulted in a large stock build-up 
initially due to the quota restriction and beginning ｾｮ＠ 1983 as a means for 
the Thai government to allocate the quota (see Chapter VIII) Storage 
costs (pellet ､･ｮｳｾｴｹＩ＠ and storage time thus become key ｣ｯｮｳｴｲ｡ｾｮｴｳ＠
leading to an ｾｮｴ･ｲｮ｡ｬ＠ demand for hard pellets Second the quota 
｡ｬｬｯ｣｡ｴｾｯｮ＠ procedure forced the big shippers [transnational corporations 
in the international grain trade (see ｔｾｴ｡ｰｩｷ｡ｴ｡ｮ｡ｫｵｮ＠ 1982) who managed 
the European end of the market] to secure more certain control over 
supplies in order to guarantee their forward contracting in Europe They 
did ｴｨｾｳ＠ by backward integration into large-scale hard ｰ･ｬｬ･ｴｾｮｧ＠ plants 
usually of European manufacture Thai manufacturera did follow with their 
own cheaper models to upgrade native pelleting plants These produced a 
quasi-hard-pellet an intermediate product between ｮ｡ｴｾｶ･＠ and hard pellets 
As the ｾｮ､ｵｳｴｲｹ＠ developed large investments were also made in storage 
and loading ｦ｡｣ｩｬｩｴｾ･ｳ＠ at export points A reflection of this investment 
is the change in size of ｳｨｾｰ＠ that carried cassava Table 7 16 charts the 
progressive change to larger bulk-cassava carriers which in turn ｩｭｰｬｾ･､＠
investment in loading facilities in Thailand In 1980 the average cargo 
size for a ship hauling cassava was 87 thousand tons This compares to an 
average size of 41 thousand tons for ships hauling grains of North American 
origin The Thai cassava trade was able to capture significant economies 
of scale in ocean transport with Rotterdam being the only port that could 
take advantage of these scale economies Prices of cassava pellets in 
Hamburg for example are as much as 50 deutsche marks more expensive per 
ton than in Rotterdam Moreover cassava shipments to the United ｋｾｮｧ､ｯｭ＠
are usually unloaded in Rotterdam and sent on lighter to U K ports 
As in biology so in ･｣ｯｮｯｭｾ｣ｳ＠ growth is a far more complex process 
than surface -- or macro -- appearances would suggest Thailand in many 
ways offers an idealized growth pattern for cassava Early growth based on 
small-scale production and processing insures syncronization between the 
two in the growth process Economies of scale are possible then when 
critica! market size and production ､･ｮｳｩｴｾ･ｳ＠ are reached It is important 
to ｶｾｳｵ｡ｬｩｺ･＠ cassava in this more dynamic sense when the comparative 
advantage of cassava versus grains is discussed later in the chapter 
Also what is important about the Thai cassava case is the rapid growth in 
investment in a industry characterized by relatively small-scale plants and 
the forward linkages that were made to ､ｯｭ･ｳｴｾ｣＠ manufacturing capacity 
Investment in small-scale rural based industries is a particular 
characteristic of Asian agriculture -- one is tempted to attribute this to 
the ｣ｯｮｳｴｲ｡ｾｮ･､＠ land resource base and the need for alternative employment 
in the rural sector the history of investment in the rural sector 
particularly irrigation and generally low incomes which makes even margins 
in small-scale processing attractive Cassava is in more ways than one 
well adapted to Asian conditions (see Chapter IX) 
ｐｲｾ｣･＠ Formation Price is the trottle that has controlled growth in 
the ｔｨ｡ｾ＠ cassava ｾｮ､ｵｳｴｲｹ＠ Understanding how prices for cassava pellets 
are formed will thus provide a basis for assessing both future prospects 
and an ｡ｰｰｲｯｰｲｾ｡ｴ･＠ response to the EEC quota Because the maJor portion of 
Thai pellets are exported of which almost all go to the EEC the price of 
pellets in Thailand and the price of pellets in Europe are interdependent 
The policy history of cassava in the EEC is discussed in Chapter VIII but 
suffice it here to say that since the binding in GATT of cassava at a 6/ 
ad valorem duty in 1968 cassava has had a competitive edge over ｧｲ｡ｾｮ＠
imports which must enter under the EEC s variable levy system Since 
domestic grain prices ｾｮ＠ the EEC are normally well above world grain prices 
and through the Common Agricultura! Policy insulated from international 
market ｣ｯｮ､ｾｴｾｯｮｳ＠ the cassava ｰｲｾ｣･＠ is formed within the relative confines 
of the EEC market The implications for the cassava price is shown ｾｮ＠
Figure 7 3 where the Rotterdam cassava ｰｲｾ｣･＠ and the maize threshold price 
TABLE 7 15 Thailand Weight per Unit Volume for Differ-
ent Cassava Products 
Product 
Chips 
Native Pellets 
Hard Pellets (Steam) 
Weight/Volume 
3 (g/ cm ) 
412 
569 
808 
Percentage 
Increase in 
Density 
(%) 
38 
96 
- - -- f ｾ＠ ,_,1_1 .., 
i"""" --... u_.•-
_,. -
ｾ＠ J -
- 1 --
TABLE 7 16 
Year 
1967 
1970 
1975 
1980 
Thailand 
Twin Deck 
Vessel 
(%) 
lOO 
lOO 
43 
2 
Size of Ship Unloading Cassava in the Rotterdam Port 1967-80 
Percent of Cassava Trade Carried by 
Bulkcarrier Bulkcarrier 
Less than 60 000 tons More then 60 000 tons 
(%) (i') 
-
o o 
o o 
57 o 
8 90 
Source Graan Elevator Maatschappij (g e m ) b v Rotterdam 
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are compared to the cif price of maize in Rotterdam World market maize 
prices and interna! EEC maize prices have significantly diverged over the 
last decade and a half However although cassava prices have remained 
above world market maize prices (at least on a feed equivalent basis) 
cassava has gotten relatively cheaper compared to EEC priced grains 
Export demand for Thai cassava and therefore the export price is determined 
by the prices for feed componente ｾｮ＠ the EEC -- import demand for cassava 
in Europe is analyzed in Chapter VIII -- however supply side factors may 
as well be affecting price formation in cassava 
The structure of the pellet market argues for the formation of cassava 
prices in the EEC feed component market with European prices being 
transmitted back to Thailand The carriers or shippers are key agents in 
price formation and transmission They are the interface between the 
European and Thai markets Moreover cassava is sold on an fob basis in 
Rotterdam That is the ｳｨｾｰｰ･ｲｳ＠ assume ownership of the cassava until its 
unloading in Europe Grains on the other hand are sold on a cif basis 
where the feed compounder has assumed ownership in say the Chicago market 
As well the maJor portion of cassava is sold on a forward basis That is 
a compounder contracts a ｣･ｲｴ｡ｾｮ＠ quantity of cassava at a specified price 
for delivery some months forward and the shipper in turn buys in ｔｨ｡ｾｬ｡ｮ､＠
in order to lock in the margin on his sale The shipper obviously must 
be in a position to monitor market conditions in both ｔｨ｡ｾｬ｡ｮ､＠ and Europe 
and companies such as Krohn & Co Peter Cremer and Alfred C Toepfer are 
European-based companies with significant investments in Thailand 
To demonstrate the price linkage between the two markets and to 
evaluate the locus of price formation European and Thai cassava prices are 
analyzed in a framework which evaluates "causality between the two price 
series The concept of Granger causality is used in the sense that 
European prices cause Thai prices if the European prices lead the ｔｨ｡ｾ＠
prices in a sense defined by correlation between lags in the two series 
(see Bessler and Brandt 1982 Spriggs Kaylen and Bessler 1982 and 
Adamowicz Baah and Hawkins 1984) The methodology rests on prefiltering 
any autocorrelation in each series using an ARIMA estimation In this case 
the series of residuals could be reduced to a white noise series using the 
same prefilter -- this allows a valid test of Granger causality (Sims 
1972) The residuals were then cross-correlated with varying lags The 
correlations then suggest the degree to which European prices lead (cause) 
Thai cassava prices 
Four European price series are utilized representing two markets 
Rotterdam and Hamburg and representing spot market prices and the 
two-month forward contract price All European prices are from the German 
｡ｧｲｾ｣ｵｬｴｵｲ｡ｬ＠ market intelligence paper Ernahrungsdienst These series are 
analyzed in relationship to the Bangkok wholesale price for cassava 
pellets published by the Thai Tapioca Trade ａｳｳｯ｣ｩ｡ｴｾｯｮ＠ in their Tapioca 
Products Market Review ｐｲｾ｣･ｳ＠ were available on a bi-weekly and a monthly 
basis and a ｳ･ｲｾ･ｳ＠ of both time periods are analyzed from 1974 through 
1985 The period is divided into two pre-quota and post-quota ｾｮ＠ order 
to assess the impact of import restrictions on ｰｲｾ｣･＠ relationships between 
the two markets 
The cross-correlations between the ｔｨ｡ｾ＠ and European price series are 
presented in Table 7 17 First considering only the bi-weekly series two 
TABLE 7 17 Tha:iJBnd Cross-correlations betloeen Prefiltered Prlce Series for Thailand and Europe ＱＹＷｾＵ＠
Thailand Tho funth Forward Price Spot Price 
Leads(+) or 
lags(-) over Rotterdam Hamburg Rotterdam Hsmburg 
Furope Jan 1974 Oct 1982 Jan 1974 Oct 1982 Jan 1974 Oct 1982 Jan 1974 Oct 1982 
Sept 1982 Dec 1985 Sept 1982 Dec 198S Sept 1982 Dec 198S Sept 1982 Dec 1985 
ｂｩＢＢＢｫｬｾ＠
+3 periods 010 006 o 03 004 ...{) 03 o 02 -006 o os 
+2 periods o 07 o 01 009 o 03 o 07 o 01 009 000 
+l period o 21** ...{) 07 o 44** o 12 o 19** 02()k o 18** o 25* 
sinultanerus o 52** o 29** o 32** o 21* o 44** o 26* o 44** 026* 
-1 period 006 029** 011 02()k o 07 013 ...{) 01 -007 
-2 periods 009 o os o 01 006 004 ...{) 02 006 o 02 
-3 periods 008 011 o 03 -010 o 03 -009 ...{) 05 008 
ｍＺｭｴｨｬｾ＠
+3 periods o 05 -O lO o 06 ...{) 17 o 15 ...{) 20 o 06 ...{) 19 
+2 periods o 19* 011 o 03 o 33* o 07 000 o 05 006 
+1 period o 15 013 o 14 o 29* -006 011 -009 o 01 
s:urultanerus o 51** o 23 o 62** o 27 o 54** o 30** o 48** o 43** 
-1 period o 22** o 38* 022** -008 o 25** o 27 023** o 03 
-2 periods o 07 o 12 o 07 o 22 008 ...{) 02 ...{) 02 o 14 
-3 periods -011 o 23 ...{) 23** o 39* ...{) 23 040k ...{) 23 o 24 
Note ** int>lies s:lgnificance at 1% level and * int>lies s:lgnificance at 10% level 
Source CIAT 
structural features of the market are confirmed that is the forward price 
generally gives a higher correlation between markets than the spot price 
and in the case of the forward price the Rotterdam market is more closely 
linked to the Thai market then is the Hamburg market (for the spot price 
the correlations are virtually the same comparing Rotterdam and Hamburg) 
Considering then only the case of the forward price Bangkok and Rotterdam 
prices in the 1974-82 period are significantly instantaneously correlated 
i e within the two-week time frame This representa relatively efficient 
flows of information between the two markets and therefore relatively close 
price integration Somewhat contrary to expectation there is also some 
residual tendency for the Bangkok price to lead (cause) the Rotterdam 
price In the very short-run this indicates that the short-term supply 
situation in Thailand i e the ability of the shipper to fill his forward 
contracts influences the price negotiated in Europe This situation is 
even more marked in the case of Hamburg and again indicates that Hamburg is 
not as rapidly integrated with the Bangkok market as is Rotterdam 
The quota has radically changed this situation The strength of 
integration between the two markets has declined as reflected in the lower 
correlation coefficients As will be shown later this has resulted in a 
widening in the margin between the two price ser1es Moreover although 
instantaneous causality between the two series is still apparent European 
prices under the quota lead Bangkok prices Under the quota short term 
supply needs are adequately met by stocks while in Europe cassava supplies 
are constrained by the quota Cassava does not have to sell at much of a 
discount to grains in order to move available supplies Therefore 
short-term price formation shifted over to demand side factors but with a 
decline in the strength of the direct pr1ce transmission back to Thailand 
Price transmission between Europe and Thailand in the past has run in 
both directions but for monthly data at least the analys1s suggests that 
Europe leads the Thai price The price transmission process is then 
analyzed by making Thai cassava prices a function of European prices at 
varying lags the transport costs and a dummy variable for the quota 
period The results in Table 7 18 suggest that only 49% of price changes 
in Europe is passed back to Thailand in the first month and another 29% in 
the second month The transport cost variable was negative as expected 
but not significant This was due to the inability to construct a series 
that reflected the change in scale of shipping during the period the 
variable as specified assumes the same size ship Finally the dummy 
variable for the quota period is negative implying that the marg1n between 
Europe and Thailand has widened under the quota Th1s is to be expected 
with upward pressure on cassava prices in Europe due to a constrained 
supply and downward pressure on prices in Thailand due to rising stock 
levels As is explained in Chapter VIII Thai quota management pol1cy has 
utilized this larger margin to finance third-country exports rather than 
allowing a w1defall profit to accrue to cassava export companies 
The previous analysis argued that the locus of price formation in this 
cassava market occurs either at the level of negotiations between the 
shipping company and European feed manufacturer or between the shipping 
company and Thai suppliers the type of supplier depending on how far back 
into the market the shipping company is integrated This impl1es that root 
and chip pr1ces are determined by pellet prices whether set in Europe or 
TABLE 7 18 Thailand Estimates of Price ｔｲ｡ｮｳｭｾｳｳｩｯｮ＠ Equations 
between Europe and Thailand 1974-8 4 
Dependent Variable 
European Price Thai Price 
Intercept 8 36 -1 66 
(2 05) (2 31) 
Price (no lag) o 64 o 48 
(O 08) (O 06) 
Price (one month lag) o 11 o 28 
(O 09) (O 06) 
Price (two month lag) o 14 o 02 
(O 08) (O 06) 
Transport Cost Index o 07 -0 03 
(O 02) (O 02) 
Quota Dummy 4 30 -1 73 
(O 98) (O 99) 
R2 o 62 o 55 
Note European ｰｲｾ｣･ｳ＠ were monthly two month forward cassava 
pellet prices in Rotterdam Thai prices were monthly 
wholesale Bangkok prices for cassava pellets Extimates 
were corrected for second-order autocorrelation Numbers 
in parentheses are standard deviations 
Source CIAT 
in Thailand This pattern is distinct from grains were normally 
processing is a mark-up on grain prices set in bulk wholesaling markets 
In the cassava situation the standard accounting for the chip and pelleting 
processing are 
P = e P + e + R and 
e e r e e 
P = e P + e + R p p e p p 
where p representa price e is conversion rate e is operating cost and R 
is operating profit and the subscripts refer to roots(r} chips(c) and 
pelleta (p} However given the assumptions on price formation price 
transmission equations for cassava chips and roots are as follows 
p 1 p 
- (e + R ) and = 
r e e e 
e 
e 
p 1 p (e + R ) = -e p p p 
e p 
Making the variables stochastic and assuming an error term the above 
equations were estimated and the results are presented in Table 7 19 The 
pellet equations follow expectations with the estimated conversion rates 
being within a reasonable range of but somewhat below the figure of 976 
cited by industrial sources The estimated operating margin (per 100 kg ) 
however is ｳｾｧｮｩｦｩ｣｡ｮｴｬｹ＠ below the actual budgeted costs of pelleting (see 
below) Nevertheless what the price ｴｲ｡ｮｳｭｩｳｳｾｯｮ＠ equations for pellets do 
suggest is quite restricted margins and therefore a very ｣ｯｭｰ･ｴｩｴｾｶ･＠
industry 
The chip equations on the other hand only partially confirm 
expectations The ｣ｯｮｶ･ｲｳｾｯｮ＠ ratea in ehonburi and Rayong are very close 
to the 372 figure used by industrial sources while the estimated 
conversion rate in Korat is unreasonably high suggesting a far higher 
leve! of efficiency than can be expected to be the case On the other 
hand the operating margin estimates cover a wide range from being 
reasonable in Korat to being significantly positive in ･ｨｯｮ｢ｵｲｾ＠ i e 
reflecting operating losses The equations suggest a delicate balance 
between operating margins and conversion rates a binding charactistic in 
the profitable operation of a chipping plant The equations again 
demonstrate the limited margins ｷｩｴｨｾｮ＠ which the chipping plants have to 
operate to turn a profit Given the chip price competition within the 
industry has generated relatively high root prices and limited operating 
margins 
Price formation in summary in the ｔｨ｡ｾＭｅｵｲｯｰ･｡ｮ＠ pellet market is 
efficient reflecting the very competitive nature of the Thai cassava 
industry Any excess profits when they occur either accrue to cassava 
farmers or result in inflated margins for the ｳｨｾｰｰｩｮｧ＠ companies (Figure 
7 4) The later has occurred as a result of the imposition of the quota 
but Thai policy has issured that these windfall profits are directed 
towards opening up new markets for cassava pelleta 
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Profitability of the Cassava Pellet Industry The very marked rate of 
growth in the Thai cassava industry was driven by the relative 
profitability of the industry especially since prices set in Europe were 
efficiently transmHted to cassava root producers The profitability of 
cassava at the farm level is shown in Figure 7 4 ｷｨｾ｣ｨ＠ presents a graphic 
picture of margin development in the cassava industry Farm-level profits 
were highly variable but even in years with low prices profits were 
sigm.ficant Not surprisingly root production showed continuous growth 
even with quite significant variability in prices 
Another major characteristic of the cassava industry is that the 
farm-level root price makes up only between 40 to 504 of the eventual 
f o b ｰｲｾ｣･＠ By comparison farm level production costs make up 83% of 
f o b costs of maize in the U S A (Ortmann Stulip and Rask 1986) The 
ability of cassava to compete with grains thus lies in ｾｴｳ＠ relatively low 
production costs and an efficient processing industry As seen in ｆｾｧｵｲ･＠
7 4 the processing margin did not vary significantly over the 197 5-84 
period 
Cassava is very profitable for Thailand A complete cost accounting 
for 1981 is summarized in Table 7 20 (see Appendix 7 2 for details) The 
costs are disaggregated by domestic factor costs foreign import costs and 
government taxes including tariffs All costs are at 1981 market prices 
with interest rates being at the commercial loan rate of 19% Íhere are no 
ｩｮ､ｾ｣｡ｴｩｯｮｳ＠ of any market imperfections that would cause market prices of 
factors to deviate from their opportunity cost (see Bertrand 1980 and 
Lokaphadhana 1981) Nor until the quota was there any intervention by the 
government in the cassava export trade The Thai cassava industry was one 
of the few examples of an industry that functioned without government 
intervention Deducting taxes and tariffs thus closely approximates social 
costs of producing cassava 
The cost breakdown suggests that root production costs are two-thrids 
of total f o b costs of cassava pellets Chipping pelleting and export 
costs relatively equally divide the other ｴｨｾｲ､＠ Labor is by far the 
largest cost component making up 4 7% of total costs Import costs are 
relatively low making up only 11% of production costa Comparing costs to 
1981 prices implies that almost 30% of the f o b price was garnered by the 
economy as social profit with almost two-thirds of that going to the 
cassava farmer From a social point of view cassava was very profitable to 
the Thai economy and especially for the incomes of the population in the 
poorest sector of the economy the rural Northeast 
The quota has made apparent the ｰｯｬｩｴｾ｣｡ｬ＠ underpinnings of the 
ｩｮｴ･ｲｮ｡ｴｾｯｮ｡ｬ＠ market for cassava pellets Uncertainty about long-term 
access to the European market has raised the question about the ability of 
the Thai cassava industry to compete in the larger international feedgrain 
market The first point to emphasize is that because Thailand did not sell 
cassava in the international ｦ･･､ｧｲ｡ｾｮ＠ market up till the quota does not 
necessarily ｾｭｰｬｹ＠ that cassava could not compete in that market The 
analysis to date and that presented in Chapter VIII clearly shows that 
Thailand could sell all its production ｾｮ＠ Europe at prices above what could 
have been obtained on the world feedgrain market obviously it was more 
profitable for Thailand to sell all ｾｴｳ＠ production in the European market 
This situation has changed with the quota and the issue of cassava' s 
TABLE 7 19 Thailand Estimated Equations for MargLn Determination for 
Chips and Pellets 1974-84 
Roots to Chips Chips to Pellets 
Chonburi Rayong Korat Chomburi Korat 
Margin 8 63 o 53 -18 09 -6 39 -8 41 
(Baht/100kg) (2 19) (2 05) (3 35) (1 81) (2 12) 
ConversLon Rate o 35 o 37 o 52 o 94 o 91 
(O 01) (O 01) (O 02) (O 01) (O 01) 
R2 077 o 82 o 79 o 98 o 97 
Note Numbers Ln parentheses are standard deviations 
Source CIAT 
TABLE 7 20 Thailand Social Cost Accounting of Cassava Pellet Exports 
1980-81 
Total 
Farm Chipper Pelle ter Exporter Costs 
(Baht/t) (Baht/t) (Baht/t) (Baht/t) (Baht/t) 
Purchase Price 1480 1792 1958 
Sales Price 1480 1792 1958 2471 2471 
Factor Costs 
Land 140 4 140 4 
Labor 655 1 45 4 51 1 43 7 795 3 
Capital 251 8 74 9 119 1 131 4 577 2 
Foreign Exchange 
Costs 76 4 48 o 59 2 183 6 
Total Costs 1123 7 1648 3 2021 4 2133 o 1696 5 
Government Tax 22 7 23 6 27 9 18 4 92 6 
Rent 333 6 120 1 -91 3 319 5 681 9 
Source Appendix 7 2 
TABLE 7 21 Comparison of Costs of Maize from ｾｾｪｯｲ＠ Exporters and Cassava 
(on a maize equivalent basis) from Thailand cif Japan 
Maize Cassava 
U S A Argentina Brazil Thailand 
($/t) ($/t) ($/t) ($/t) 
Production Costs 
Variable Costs 60 o 37 9 66 6 52 6 
Fixed Costs 59 8 32 9 68 2 7 7 
Total Costs 119 8 70 8 134 8 60 3 
Marketing and Processing 24 7 25 3 33 9 33 8 
F O B Costs 144 5 96 1 168 7 94 1 
Freight to Japan 26 o 32 4 34 2 10 o 
e r F Costs 170 5 128 5 202 9 104 1 
Yield (t/ha) 6 25 3 36 2 22 5 22 
Note All costs are at 1985 prices and exchange rates Thai cassava costs 
represent 1981 costs multiplied by wholesale price index and divided 
by 1985 exchange rate Costs are then put on a maize equivalent 
basis by dividing by O 7 
Source Maize Ortmann G U J Stulp and N Rask International Trade 
and Economic Development Examples of Comparative Costs in Inter-
national Commodities 1986 and Cassava CIAT 
ability to compete 
(In Chapter VIII 
wider market while 
allotment) 
in the wider feedgrain market is now a policy concern 
the issue is addressed of how Thailand develops this 
continuing to garner the social profits from the quota 
International comparative advantage has commonly been analyzed within 
a domestic resource cost framework (Pearson Akrasanee and Nelson 1976) 
This methodology takes border prices (f o b prices for exporters and e i f 
prices for importers) as the measure against which comparative advantage is 
assessed A good summary statistic is the resource cost ratio (Page and 
Stryker 1981) where any country with a ratio less than one has a 
comparative advantage in the production of that commodity For cassava in 
1981 us1ng Thai f o b prices the RCR was 71 indicating significant 
comparative advantage in supplying cassava to the European market To 
evaluate social profitability of selling on the international grain market 
the break-even price (the f o b price at which the RCR is one) is 
calculated This price is $77/t Assuming that under normal circumstances 
cassava competes with maize at about 7 of the maize price (see Chapter 
VIII) then the maize equivalent price is $110/t This compares very 
favorably to the f o b price of maize in Thailand and in the U S in the 
1980 1 S 
The issue can be taken one step further and f o b costs compared to 
f o b costs of major maize exporters (Table 7 21) Comparing Thai cassava 
costs on a maize equivalent basis with those developed by Ortmann Stulip 
and Rask (1986) shows that cassava is very competitive with maJor ma1ze 
exporters How much cassava Thailand will produce at currently declin1ng 
world market maize prices is another issue but the same could be asked of 
countries such as the United States and France if price and income support 
policies were eliminated 
In summary the Thai cassava industry has shown itself to be very 
responsive to export opportunities and to the vagaries of policy changes in 
import markets The EEC became virtually the sole market for Thai pellets 
essentially because it was the most profitable outlet Moreover because 
of efficient price transmission between the two markets Thailand could 
respond very quickly to the changing needs of the European market The 
imposition of the quota in 1982 has forced Thailand to begin to restructure 
its export markets a subject discussed in Chapter VIII What that 
analysis shows is that Thailand has adjusted to the quota by opening new 
markets in East Asia thereby allowing domestic production to continue to 
grow 
The growth of the Thai pellet industry also offers a more general 
lesson about the development of comparative advantage in the crop 
Comparative advantage of cassava versus grain substitutes is based on 
certain physical characteristics particularly the availability of land 
with low opportun1ty cost and an agricultura! sector with a relatively 
small farm-size structure However there is also a time and scale 
dimension to comparative advantage because of the critica! importance of 
the processing component since it makes up from a third to a half of the 
total costs In cassava economies of scale 1n processing develop over 
time in relation to the concentration of production on the one hand and 
the size of the output market on the other Malaysia and Indonesia have 
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attempted to force the issue through plantation development but in cassava 
these have not been notably successful The ｳｯ｣ｾ｡ｬ＠ equity benefits from 
cassava development (marginal ｡ｧｲｾ｣ｵｬｴｵｲ｡ｬ＠ areas small-scale producers 
and rural employment in small-scale agro-industry) ｰｲｯｶｾ､･＠ strong support 
in certain circumstances for an infant industry argument to support cassava 
in the initial development of its ｰｲｯ｣･ｳｳｾｮｧ＠ capacity In Thailand this 
ｾｮｩｴｩ｡ｬ＠ protection was provided by the EEC market The Thai case 
suggests that cassava can compete with grains but in the evaluation of the 
｣ｯｭｰ｡ｲ｡ｴｾｶ･＠ advantage of cassava in the feedgrain market a time perspective 
should be incorporated for processing costs 
The Cassava Starch Market 
The cassava industry in Thailand developed initially on the ｢｡ｳｾｳ＠ of 
the market for starch Starch production and exports have continued to 
grow throughout the post-war period but the industry has declined in 
relative importance having been eclipsed by the cassava pellet market 
Nevertheless the cassava starch industry ｾｮ＠ Thailand ｶｾ･ｳ＠ with Indonesia 
as being the largest in the world It continues to be ､ｹｮ｡ｭｾ｣＠ suppling 
starch to both an expanding export market and an increasing domestic 
market 
Constructing a supply and ｵｴｩｬｾｺ｡ｴｩｯｮ＠ series for cassava starch must 
rely on data from different sources and this produces some inconsistencies 
The series in Table 7 22 is developed from independent export ｰｲｯ､ｵ｣ｴｾｯｮ＠
and ｵｴｩｬｾｺ｡ｴｩｯｮ＠ estimates and representa the author s efforts at achieving 
consistency between the estimates What the data suggests is quite 
significant growth in starch production driven through the 1970 s by 
rising domestic consumption and in the 1980 s by a sudden spurt in the 
export market 
Cassava starch has a ｷｾ､･＠ number of end markets in Thailand The 
principal use is as a raw ｭ｡ｴ･ｲｾ｡ｬ＠ in the production of monosodium 
glutamate In ｴｨｾｳ＠ industry starch competes directly with molasses which 
is interchangeable with cassava starch Starch is also important in the 
expanding pulp and paper industry in textile production and in food 
industries All of these are ｧｲｯｷｾｮｧ＠ industties and cassava starch will 
continue to enj oy an increasing domes tic market throughout ｴｨｾｳ＠ century 
However unlike other starch markets in East Asia one market which cassava 
starch has not entered is the glucose and sweetner market This is 
principally because Thailand is a producer and net exporter of sugar High 
fructose sweetners derived from cassava have been advocated as another 
possible market since 52% of ｩｮ､ｵｳｴｲｾ｡ｬ＠ sugar consumption ｾｳ＠ for beverage 
production (Frankel 1981) Moreover the ｔｨ｡ｾ＠ government has a ｰｯｬｾ｣ｹ＠ of 
subsidizing sugar exporta when world prices are low and taxing exports when 
prices are high (Lokaphadhana 1981) Nevertheless the price variability 
in cassava starch prices has made the investments needed in large-scale 
plant and capacity too risky and there has been no development in ｴｨｾｳ＠
market 
ｔｨ｡ｾｬ｡ｮ､＠ is virtually the sole exporter of cassava starch and the 
largest exporter ｾｮ＠ the world of starch in general The export market was 
ｲ･ｬ｡ｴｾｶ･ｬｹ＠ stable through the 1960 s and 1970 s but increased dramatically 
in the 1980 s as new non-traditional importers came into the market (see 
Chapter VIII) Thailand between 1980 and 1985 was able to expand exports 
by 50% in two years and virtually to double export volumes in four years 
without too much affect on domestic consumption levels ｔｨｾｳ＠ suggests the 
investment in significant excess production capacity for starch on the one 
hand and the ability of the starch industry to compete effectively with 
the pellet industry for roots in 1984 and 1985 root prices were 
relatively low due to the quota 
The starch industry needs to be very competitive in the sense that its 
margins are defined by root prices principally set by the pellet export 
market in the EEC and starch export prices set principally by international 
maize prices i e the dominant cost in maize starch ｰｲｯ､ｵ｣ｴｾｯｮ＠ (see 
Chapter VIII) The starch industry very early began a search for scale 
economies in processing essentially based on large-scale plants but with 
equipment manufactured in Thailand -- in Indonesia on the other hand 
these scale economies in starch production do not exist (Nelson 1984) 
Based on the development of this market Thailand is a now net exporter of 
cassava starch equipment including complete plants However with this 
competition to invest in order to lower processing costs excess processing 
capacity was created allowing the industry to respond so quickly to new 
export markets 
Price Formation and Profitability Like other cassava processing 
industries profHabilHy in starch production is primarily dependent on 
the conversion rate and the margin between the root buying price and the 
starch selling price Unlike the pellet industry where the price of the 
processed product leads the price of roots the starch industry must take 
the root price as a given The starch industry rarely has been able to 
underbid the chipping plants The root price thus sets the price of 
starch Competition for limited markets in turn insures both downward 
pressure on margins and the search for reductions in processing costs 
The above scenario for price formation is adequately captured in the 
ｰｲｾ｣･＠ transmission equations in Table 7 23 and the processing cost analysis 
in Table 7 24 Note that contrary to the chip industry starch price is 
the dependent variable in the regression ･ｱｵ｡ｴｾｯｮ＠ The estimated 
conversion rates are only slightly higher than the estimate of 4 34 tons of 
roots for every ton of starch given by industrial sources Even the 
estimated rates suggest very high technical efficiency in starch 
extraction The estimated operating margin compares favorably with the 
budgeting analysis in Table 7 24 Again the evidence suggests a very 
competitive industry where there is no indication of excess profits 
Moreover a domestic resource calculation would be redundant in the case of 
Thai starch since Thailand sets the world price for cassava starch and 
apart from import duties on starch processing equipment there is no 
government intervention in the starch market 
Continued growth in the starch industry is dependent principally on 
the supply price of starch which in turn is dependent on the root price 
and the changing ､ｹｮ｡ｭｾ｣ｳ＠ of the pellet market The tendency in the medium 
term is for cassava starch prices to come in line with maize starch making 
cassava starch more competitive The other major factor of course is 
growth in export markets Prospects in the international starch market are 
TABLE 7 22 Thailand Cassava Starch Production and Dlsappearance 197o-83 
llcm!stic Consumption 
fu1osodium Paper Textile Food Total 
Year Glutamate Industry Industry Industry Other Export Di.sappearance Production 
(OCOt) (OCOt) (OCOt) (OCOt) (OCOt) (OCOt) (OCOt) (OCOt) 
1970 234 6 8 6 8 360 7 1 144 7 224 8 173 6 
1971 290 7 9 8 4 37 1 8 1 149 8 240 3 157 6 
1972 33 3 104 9 o 382 107 129 2 230 8 201 1 
1973 346 103 10 1 39 3 139 176 7 284 9 286 8 
1974 346 133 10 o 404 17 4 2525 368 2 315 7 
1975 366 112 108 41 S 20 S 
-M!U 265 3 409 9 
1976 33 S 15 4 131 42 S 24 6 236 3 365 4 513 o 
1977 37 2 18 9 135 43 6 288 200 8 342 8 538 S 
1978 408 20 1 14 3 447 33 2 235 9 389 o 411 o 
1979 382 24 7 14 S 45 7 387 122 S 284 3 3050 
1980 37 2 26 2 15 8 460 43 1 243 6 411 9 432 9 
1981 57 7 31 3 14 3 469 361 ｾＳＰＸＱ＠ 494 4 504 1 
1982 547 37 3 14 8 47 8 ＴＲＹｾｾ＠ 3870 584 S 590 1 
1983 608 444 15 3 488 47 2 tfV 363 S 5800 573 9 
Note Di.sappearance and production data are derlved from different sources llireover change in stocks 
are not included There is a definite discrepancy in the 1970-72 perlad 
Soorce Production Industrial Econonú.cs and Planning Division Ministry of Wustry Bangkok 
Danestl.c Consumption Titapiwatanakun Boon]it 'IX:rnestic Tapioca Starch Consumption in 
Thailand 1982 
Exporta Center for Agricultura! Statl.stics Office of Agricultura! &omm:l.cs Ministry of 
Agrlculture and Cooperatives Bangkok 
TABLE 7 23 
Margin 
Thailand Estimated Equations for Margin 
Determination in Starch 
Processing 1974-84 
Chonburi Rayong 
108 7 116 4 
(25 6) (20 3) 
Conversion Rate 4 73 4 91 
(O 35) (O 29) 
R2 o 61 o 70 
Note Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations 
Source CIAT 
TABLE 7 24 Thailand Costs of Production of Starch in 
Large-Scale Processing Plant 
1981 
Cost Item 
Variable Costs 
Roots 
Labor 
Electricity 
Fuel for drier 
Fuel for vehicles 
Repair and maintenance 
Transport to Bangkok 
Working capital 
Sub-total 
Fixed Cost 
Admim.stration 
Capital depreciation 
Fixed capital costs 
Sub-total 
Total Costs 
Costs no including roots 
Starch Price 
Value of Cassava Waste 
Cost 
(Baht/t of starch) 
2608 7 
142 o 
366 7 
235 o 
16 o 
264 8 
120 o 
30 6 
3783 8 
41 8 
116 3 
251 7 
409 8 
4193 6 
1584 9 
3750 
365 
Note The capacity of the plant is 100t of starch per 
day and produced 15 S thousand tons in average 
year The conversion rate is 4 35 tons of roots 
for 1 ton of starch 
Source CIAT survey 
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analyzed in Chapter VIII and suggest that markets open only where the 
country loses the ability to meet its own domestic needs 
The Animal Feed Market 
There is no better illustration of the lack of integration between 
world market maize and cassava prices than the comparative role that these 
two export crops have played in the development of ｔｨ｡ｾｬ｡ｮ､＠ s domestic feed 
concentrate industry Maize has formed the carbohydrate base for this 
rapidly growing industry basically because it has been more profitable to 
export the cassava On those relatively rare occassions when the prices of 
the two commodities have come into line cassava has been used domestically 
in the manufacture of animal feeds This has happened more often since the 
imposition of the quota and given the current size of the domestic market 
the animal feed market could start to play a larger role in putting an 
absolute floor under cassava prices 
Starting in the late 1960's basic structural changes in the 
production of both swine and poultry have formed the basis for the rapid 
expansion in the feed concentrate industry Prior to this time both swine 
and poultry were raised in small-scale integrated crop-livestock systems 
Swine continues to be raised principally in the central plain This region 
is relatively close to the Bangkok market and forms the main rice growing 
area where rice bran and other by-products provide a plentiful feed 
source Commercial operations of over 50 hogs have increased their 
production share from approximately 12% in 1974 to 14-' in 1978 to around 
15% in 1983 (Chesley 1985) Development of commercial swine operations 
however has been constrained by the Animal Slaughtering and Meat Control 
Act of 1959 which allows only local authorities to establish 
slaughterhouses and prohibHs shipment of carcasses outside the legally 
defined market area of each slaughterhouse This has resulted in local 
monopsonies in slaughter facilities resulting in ｨｾｧｨ＠ costs and 
inefficient wholesaling of carcasses (see Chesley 1985 for further 
discussion) A high percentage of the slaughter is done illegally but this 
is difficult for large commercial growers Nevertheless swine numbers 
have continued to increase especially since the mid-1970 s (Table 7 25) 
Structural change in the poultry industry has been even more rapid 
(Table 7 25) often motivated through ｶ･ｲｴｾ｣｡ｬ＠ integration of feed 
companies backwards to commercial poultry production units The broiler 
industry has been by far the most dynamic animal sector in Thaüand 
increasing nine-fold in the 1974-82 period Partly this arises from the 
restrictions on the pork sector and partly from the very rapid technical 
change in the poultry sector The later is reflected in the declining 
relative price of chicken compared to other meats (Figure 7 5) and a 
virtual doubling of per capita ｣ｯｮｳｵｭｰｴｾｯｮ＠ of chicken over the course of 
the 1970 s The only limita on growth in this industry a technically 
efficient industry with access to cheap feed sources is the size of the 
domestic market With total per ｣｡ｰｾｴ｡＠ meat consumption still at 
relatively low levels and population and income still pro)ected to grow 
there ｾｳ＠ no hint yet of a downturn in growth Moreover Thailand is 
developing as a major exporter of poultry in the East Asian and Middle 
Eastern market 
TABLE 7 25 Thailand Swine and Poultry Population 1970-82 
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
Swine 
(thousand) 
3215 
3348 
3335 
3004 
3256 
3866 
5201 
5420 
6713 
7343 
6589 
6448 
n a 
Poultry 
Cornmercial 
Village 
Chickens 
(million) 
Layers 
(million) 
-------- 154 2 ---------
-------- 156 9 ---------
-------- 148 2 ---------
126 2 7 4 
105 9 7 o 
83 1 8 9 
92 9 9 o 
76 9 9 6 
61 1 10 4 
Broilers 
(million) 
36 4 
41 6 
58 2 
78 o 
104 o 
130 o 
200 o 
234 o 
286 o 
Total 
(million) 
136 3 
150 7 
166 8 
182 2 
190 6 
198 5 
206 4 
211 6 
216 9 
222 o 
301 9 
320 5 
357 5 
Source Derived from Chesley Merritt The Demand for Livestock Feed in Thailand 1985 
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The dynamism in the meat sector has been integrally linked to a 
dynamic industrial feed sector Production of balanced feeds have 
ｾｮ｣ｲ･｡ｳ･､＠ from a mere 64 thousand tons in 1968 to 2 1 ｭｩｬｬｾｯｮ＠ tons in 1984 
Although initially based on swine feeds the real growth in production has 
come in broiler feeds This expansion in the feed sector has induced rapid 
ｾｮ｣ｲ･｡ｳ･ｳ＠ in the derived demand for carbohydrate sources This demand has 
been met almost exclusively by domestically produced maize The maize 
sector has also been very ､ｹｮ｡ｭｾ｣＠ in the last two decades (Table 7 26) 
increasing from a production level of just over half a million tons in 1960 
to well over 4 million tons in 1984 Production growth in the 1960's went 
almost exclusively into exports However since about 1970 a growing share 
has gene to meet the needs of the domestic feed sector and ｳｾｮ｣･＠ that 
point exports have been relatively stable at around 2 million tons 
Cassava's potential as a carbohydrate source in the animal feed market 
is defined in Table 7 27 and Figure 7 6 Cassava comes into the least cost 
feed ration when its price is about 67 of the price of maize This ｲ｡ｴｾｯ＠
is somewhat low because the prices of soybean meal which is principally 
imported are maintained relatively high through import taxes These taxes 
have risen from 5 to 6 percent in the late 1970 s to 8 5 percent in 1983 
(Chesley 1985) Thus cassava came into the ration in 1981 and again in 
1984 Over the period 1971-85 cassava was never ｣ｯｭｰ･ｴｩｴｾｶ･ｬｹ＠ priced with 
maize for any extended period of time (Figure 7 6) Thus cassava has 
never been a feature of the domestic feed market Nevertheless in 1985 
feed manufacturers for the first time began to use ｳｩｧｮｾｦｩ｣｡ｮｴ＠ volumes of 
cassava in their feed mixtures An estimated 625 thousand tons was used in 
feeds in 1985 However these competitive price relationships did not last 
through the end of 1985 and cassava again moved out of the ration 
This situation is in fact quite favorable for cassava producers The 
animal feed industry has a solid raw material supply in maize but when 
substitutes are cheaper manufactures can profitably mix them in their 
rations Price is the determining factor for these feed components not 
｣ｯｮｴｩｮｵｾｴｹ＠ of supply Since cassava is readily available feed 
manufacturers can easily move into cassava when price relatives are 
favorable As domestic feed manufacturers gain experience in ｵｳｾｮｧ＠
cassava initially in swine feeds the domestic feed market could put an 
absolute price floor under the cassava market At these times cassava will 
essentially be competitive with world market feedgrain prices but the 
logical market on which to sell is the ､ｯｭ･ｳｴｾ｣＠ rather then the export 
market When cassava prices are above maize prices the cassava producer 
is much the better off The domestic animal feed market is now large 
enough that it can play such a role in supporting cassava prices 
Conclusions 
Cassava led the rapid post-war expansion in upland agriculture in 
Thailand While maize and sugarcane expanded principally in the Central 
Plain provinces cassava area increased first in the East and then expanded 
rapidly in the poorest area of Thailand the Northeast Thailand was able 
to base exploitation of an agricultura! ｦｲｯｮｴｾ･ｲ＠ aided by 
labor-substituting technologies in the 1970 s on development of export 
markets This was as true for maize as it was for cassava The expansion 
in cassava started in the 1950's and continued through the early 1960's 
TABLE 7 26 Thailand Maize Production and Utilization 1960-61 1982-83 
Total Feed Use 
Domestic Use Domes tic As % of 
b Use as Total Total Feed % of Total Domes tic 
Cropyear a Production Exports Total Use Production Use 
(000 t) (000 t) (000 t) (000 t) (%) (%) 
----------------- (1000 tons) -----------------
1960-61 544 519 10 2 2 20 
1961-62 598 589 15 4 3 27 
1962-63 665 722 15 4 2 27 
1963-64 858 923 20 6 2 30 
1964-65 935 896 25 10 3 40 
1965-66 1021 1132 29 10 3 34 
1966-67 1122 liBO 35 13 3 37 
1967-68 1315 1214 55 25 4 45 
1968-69 1507 1289 104 75 7 72 
1969-70 1700 1502 176 140 10 80 
1970-71 1938 1663 220 180 11 82 
1971-72 2300 2111 280 235 12 84 
1972-73 1315 1039 295 270 22 92 
1973-74 2339 2ll2 348 300 15 86 
1974-75 2500 1872 608 560 24 92 
1975-76 2863 2442 313 250 11 80 
1976-77 2675 1982 787 730 29 93 
1977-78 1677 1297 397 365 24 92 
1978-79 2791 2155 614 560 22 91 
1979-80 2863 1825 652 590 23 90 
1980-81 2998 2418 797 749 25 94 
1981-82 3449 3079 846 821 24 97 
1982-83 3002 2244 971 942 31 97 
a All data are for July-June cropyears b Does not include beginning or ending stocks therefore exports and domestic 
consumption do not add up to production 
Source Ches ley Merritt The Demand for Livestock Feed in Thailand 1985 
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TABLE 7 27 Thailand Optimal Composition of Poultry Rations Derived in Least Cost Feed 
Formulation 1981-84 
1981 1982 1983 1984 
Ingredient Price Entry Price Entry Price Entry Price Entry 
(Baht/kg) O'l (Baht/kg) (%) (Baht/kg) (%) (Baht/kg) ( .C:l 
Cassava 1 91 9 6 2 11 o 2 51 o 1 70 25 o 
Maize 2 91 45 8 2 87 56 7 3 15 56 7 3 08 25 3 
Soybean Meal 7 74 21 4 7 46 14 4 7 46 14 4 7 so 24 9 
Fish Meal 11 09 7 S 10 54 7 S 10 99 7 S 11 00 7 S 
Note All ingredients are not shown here Kapok meal entered at a significant leve! in 
1982 and 1983 
Source Prices are wholesale Bangkok and are from the Office of Agricultura! Economics 
the model was developed by CIAT 
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being based ｰｲｩｮ｣ｾｰ｡ｬｬｹ＠ on the starch export market It is a mark of 
Thailand s ability to take optimum advantage of changes in international 
market conditions that with the GATT binding of the cassava tariff in 1968 
creating a hole in the EEC s variable levy system Thai cassava exports 
could respond so rapidly Thus the Thai cassava boom should not be seen 
as ｵｮｾｱｵ･ｬｹ＠ determined by a favorable tariff rate in the EEC but equally 
ｾｭｰｯｲｴ｡ｮｴ＠ was the dynamism of upland agriculture and the ｡､､ｩｴｾｯｮ｡ｬ＠ land 
and labor resources that could be brought into production in response to 
profitable export markets 
Thai success in cassava however has been at the expense of the EEC s 
political objectives The resulting voluntary export quota has created an 
air of uncertainty as Thailand has had to rapidly develop its own policy 
response and control procedures It is ironical indeed that Thailand' s 
only policy intervention in the cassava sector is a negative one even 
though forced by the EEC The uncertainty however should not be 
interpreted as portending eminent decline in the cassava industry Rather 
a period of structural adjustment has been forced on the industry which in 
the end will lay the basis for more ､ｾｶ･ｲｳｩｴｹ＠ in end markets and even more 
efficient production The short-run policy problem for Thailand has been 
to develop a policy that allows the country to capture the social ｰｲｯｦｾｴｳ＠
earned in the EEC and to the extent possible to transfer these benefits 
to cassava producers especially in the Northeast The solution requires 
an analysis of alternative export markets and this is left till Chapter 
VIII Suffice it to say that Thailand has managed to make the adjustment 
and expand its export markets principally in East Asia Moreover root 
production has even increased during the quota period Future growth ｷｾｬｬ＠
be based on continued penetration of these new export markets 
Nevertheless there has been downward pressure on farm-level ｰｲｾ｣･ｳ＠
under the quota and the more the need to export to third-country markets 
the more the downward pressure on root prices Over the past twenty years 
Thailand has significantly reduced cassava processing costs Farmers have 
also adjusted to rising labor costs by adopting labor-saving ｴ･｣ｨｮｯｬｯｧｾ･ｳ＠
What has not happened and what is becoming critical as root prices come 
down is the adoption of ｹｩ･ｬ､Ｍｾｮ｣ｲ･｡ｳｩｮｧ＠ technology Yields have remained 
relatively constant over the past twenty years even though area has 
expanded into more marginal areas and fertilizer has not been used in 
trad1tional growing areas Under current monocropping conditions ｹｾ･ｬ､ｳ＠
will eventually decline catching farmers in a cost-price squeeze A 
fertilization and soil management strategy that quarantees a profitable 
return is needed to complement improved varieties This will insure the 
ability of Thai cassava to compete in the wider feedgrain market ｡ｬｬｯｷｾｮｧ＠
Thailand the required flexibility in restructuring its export markets 
Most important of all cassava will then have achieved parity with grains 
in international markets establishing a new claim for carbohydrate exports 
from the tropics a role palm oil has recently carved out in the world 
vegetable oil market 
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Appendl.X 7 1 A ｓｹｮｴｨ･ｳｾｳ＠ of Production and Utilization 
Cassava production has grown rapidly in the last two and a half 
decades ｷｾｴｨ＠ most of the root production being processed for export 
Domestic consumption of cassava is limited te starch and the ｯ｣｣｡ｳｾｯｮ｡ｬ＠ use 
of chips ｾｮ＠ animal feed concentrates Thailand should be a country 
therefore where cassava utilization and production data are relatively 
consistent 
A production series is produced both by the Division of Agricultura! 
Economics (DAE) and the Department of ａｧｲｾ｣ｵｬｴｵｲ｡ｬ＠ ｅｸｴ･ｮｳｾｯｮ＠ (AEX) both of 
which form part of the Ministry of Agriculture and ｃｯｯｰ･ｲ｡ｴｾｶ･ｳ＠ Both the 
DAE and AEX maintained the same series through the 1968/69 crop year but 
diverged then when the DAE changed procedures In general the DAE series 
is most ｵｴｾｬｩｺ･､＠ ｾｮ＠ the literature and is the ene reported by FAO Both 
ｳ･ｲｾ･ｳ＠ show the same basic upward trend but in any particular year can 
diverge by as much as 25% 
Converting exports te a fresh weight basis and comparing this export 
series te the production series (Table 7A 1) shows that the production data 
tended te be consistently underestimated in the case of the AEX before 
1973/74 and in the case of the DAE before 1982/83 Titapiwdtanakun (1979) 
reviews this discrepancy in some detail and attributes the difference te a 
failure te accurately monitor the rapid expansion in area especially where 
cassava was being planted in more frontier-like conditions in the 
Northeast The DAE production ｳ･ｲｾ･ｳ＠ thus provides a relatively consistent 
underestimate of actual production and the export series probably provides 
a more accurate minimum estimate of actual ｰｲｯ､ｵ｣ｴｾｯｮ＠
The Ministry of Commerce has developed supply and ｵｴｩｬｩｺ｡ｴｾｯｮ＠
estimates for cassava (Table 7A 2) These clearly highlight the dominance 
of the export market but also identify a not ｵｮｾｭｰｯｲｴ｡ｮｴ＠ ､ｯｭ･ｳｴｾ｣＠ market 
for both starch and animal feed The other dominant component is the very 
high stock levels being held in this period The production estimate 
constructed from utilization data is about 11% larger than the DAE estimate 
of production Thus Thailand ｰｲｯｶｾ､･ｳ＠ ene of the few cases (Malaysia is 
the other) where cassava production tends te be underestimated 
TABLE 7 A 1 Thailand Comparison of Root Production 
Series with Implied Production from 
Export Series 1960-85 
Agricultura! Export 
Year Economics Extension Series 
(000 t) (000 t) (000 t) 
1960 1083 1083 1109 
1961 1222 1222 1706 
1962 1726 1726 1298 
1963 2077 2077 1341 
1964 2111 2111 2089 
1965 1557 1557 1864 
1966 1475 1475 1850 
1967 1892 1892 2265 
1968 2063 2063 2487 
1969 2611 2611 2684 
1970 3079 2474 3645 
1971 3431 2432 3169 
1972 3114 3673 3575 
1973 3974 4436 4995 
1974 5443 7770 6554 
1975 6765 9503 6238 
1976 7094 11 638 9778 
1977 10 230 13 554 10 242 
1978 11 840 13 024 15 953 
1979 16 358 12 877 10 023 
1980 11 101 13 864 13 442 
1981 16 540 17 204 16 160 
1982 17 744 n a 20 147 
1983 17 788 n a 13 718 
1984 18 989 n a 17 014 
1985 19 985 n a 18 812 
Source Office of Agricultura! Economics Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives and Department of 
Agricultura! Extension M1.nistry of Agriculture 
and Cooperatives 
TABLE 7 A 2 Thailand 
Disappearance 
ｄｯｭ･ｳｴｾ｣＠ Consumption 
Starch 
Animal Feed 
Export 
Starch 
Pellets and Chips 
Change in Stocks 
Total 
Production 
Harvested 
Unharvested 
Total 
Supply and Disappearance of Cassava 
(fresh weight basis) 1984-85 
Fresh Root Equivalent 
(000 t) 
1 100 
625 
2 435 
15 365 
1 731 
21 256 
21 256 
1 000 
22 256 
Source Ministry of Commerce Bangkok 

